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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed of three essays examining the impact of time varying
volatility on firm decision making.
The first essay examines the effect of oil price volatility on price setting behavior
using Producer Price Index micro data. I analyze whether two measures of price
flexibility, price change frequency and dispersion, are affected by changes in oil price
volatility. Heterogeneity in oil usage across industries is used to construct industry
specific measures of oil price volatility. I find that price changes are more dispersed
in high oil usage industries during months with high oil price volatility, however
frequency of price change does not change. These results imply that aggregate price
level flexibility does not fall during periods of high aggregate volatility.
The second essay constructs a state-dependent pricing model with time varying oil
price volatility to study if changes in aggregate volatility alter the impulse response
of output to monetary policy. Firms use oil as an input to production, while oil
price and oil price volatility processes are exogenous. Random menu costs enable
the model to match the positive empirical relationship between oil price volatility
and price change dispersion. A model simulation examines a counterfactual period
of high oil price volatility and implies that increases in aggregate volatility do not
substantially reduce the ability of monetary policy to stimulate output.
vii
The third essay examines the impact of time varying idiosyncratic uncertainty
on investment with multiple types of capital. A model with two types of capital,
short-lived equipment and long-lived structures, and nonconvex adjustment costs is
constructed to examine the role of economies of scope on investment purchases. Ev-
idence from a structural vector autoregression shows that investment in structures
falls four quarters after an uncertainty shock, while investment in equipment falls
within one quarter. The model with economies of scope in investment purchases is
consistent with these results.
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1Chapter 1
Price Setting and Volatility: Evidence
from Oil Price Volatility Shocks
1.1 Introduction
Do changes in aggregate volatility alter the ability of monetary policy to stim-
ulate the economy? During periods of high volatility, the economy is buffeted by
large macroeconomic shocks that are likely to impact price changes. Policy mak-
ers are concerned that policy effectiveness may decrease during these periods. This
paper examines the role of time varying aggregate volatility in price setting and its
implications for monetary policy.
Monetary policy effectiveness is dependent on the flexibility of the aggregate price
level, which is determined by the the extent to which firms change their price in the
same direction after monetary stimulus. A key measure of the extent to which price
changes move together is price change dispersion. I analyze whether price change
dispersion is affected by heightened volatility and find that price change dispersion
increases during periods of greater volatility.
I use well-measured and plausibly exogenous oil price volatility shocks to study
how price setting behavior responds to changes in the volatility of a common shock.
Oil price shocks are advantageous in studying how prices react to changes in volatility
for three reasons. First, oil price volatility has large variation over time. Secondly,
heterogeneity in oil usage across sectors allows me to construct industry-specific ex-
2posure to oil shocks in the spirit of Bartik (1991). Industries that rely on oil more
intensively as an input would be expected to have stronger responses to oil price
volatility shocks. Lastly, the industry-specific oil demand variables are plausibly ex-
ogenous common volatility shocks. Oil prices are also a specific source of volatility
that the FOMC is concerned about, as the following quote shows.
What will happen with the price of oil? The uncertainties are sizable, and
progress toward our goals and, by implication, the appropriate stance of
monetary policy will depend on how these uncertainties evolve.
Janet Yellen, June 6, 2016
My main finding is that increased oil price volatility leads to increased price change
dispersion, which means that monetary policy is not less effective. I show this by using
heterogeneity in long run oil usage, and find that industries more exposed to oil exhibit
greater price change dispersion in response to increases in volatility than industries
with low oil exposure. My main results imply that the doubling of oil price volatility
from December 2007 to September 2008 explains 44% of the average increase in price
change dispersion. The results are robust to various measures of volatility, additional
control variables, and hold both within and outside of the 2008 crisis period.
Monetary policy has the ability to stimulate output by changing the supply of
money in a basic monetary framework. However, if prices are completely flexible, then
monetary policy has no effect on output. Micro-price data shows that prices change
approximately twice a year for both consumer and producer goods. Yet the selection
of prices that do change is also important for monetary non-neutrality. Greater
dispersion of price changes lowers the fraction of price changes that are affected by
a change in money, and is therefore a key measure of the degree of monetary non-
neutrality. This is illustrated in Figures 1·1 and 1·2. The left panels show a disperse
and less disperse desired price change distribution prior to a monetary shock. Both
3((a)) No Shock ((b)) Positive Monetary Shock
Figure 1·1: Disperse Desired Price Change Distribution
((a)) No Shock ((b)) Positive Monetary Shock
Figure 1·2: Less Disperse Desired Price Change Distribution
distributions feature positive and negative price changes but have on average positive
price changes.
The right panels show the distribution after a positive monetary shock. An in-
crease in the supply of money shifts the desired price change distribution to the right,
with more positive price changes than prior to the shock. The purple area shows
the increase in positive price changes. The figures show that the monetary shock
has greater inflationary consequences in the less disperse distribution, as more de-
sired prices are close to the adjustment threshold. Heightened aggregate volatility
causes the price change distribution to be more disperse, which leads to decreased
inflationary effects and increased real effects of monetary policy.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the micro-price data
and oil volatility processes. Section 1.3 analyzes the micro-price data and shows that
price changes are more dispersed during periods of high oil volatility for industries
with greater sensitivity to oil. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to our understanding of the effects of volatility on the
economy. The literature includes the seminal paper on volatility of Bloom (2009) and
4the introduction of volatility into a general equilibrium framework of Bloom et al.
(2014). Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2014) study the effects of changes in fiscal policy
volatility in a New Keynesian model with quadratic adjustment costs for pricing.
This paper differs by studying the effects of oil price volatility in a model with fixed
costs of adjustment for pricing while matching micro-pricing facts.
Within the literature on the association between volatility and price setting be-
havior, Vavra (2014) and Bachmann et al. (2013) are most closely related to this
paper. Vavra (2014) studies the impact of idiosyncratic volatility shocks on price
setting moments over time. He uses CPI data to document the distribution of final
goods prices over the business cycle and shows that the cross sectional variance of
price changes as well as frequency of price adjustment are countercyclical. The paper
then shows that these two facts are matched by a standard menu cost model with
second moment shocks to idiosyncratic productivity, while a model with only first
moment shocks makes the counterfactual prediction that price change dispersion and
frequency of adjustment are negatively correlated. Bachmann et al. (2013) asks how
business forecast uncertainty affects the frequency of price change. They find that
increased uncertainty about production increases price flexibility. My paper differs
by examining the effects of a common source of volatility on price setting behavior.
More broadly in the price setting literature, papers have investigated how various
sources of volatility affect prices. Baley and Blanco (2015) construct a model with
menu costs and imperfect information about idiosyncratic productivity, and find that
this mechanism strengthens the volatility effect and increases price flexibility due to
uncertainty. Drenik and Perez (2014) use the manipulation of inflation statistics in
Argentina to understand the role of informational frictions on price level dispersion.
They find that the manipulation of statistics is associated with greater price level
dispersion, and construct a price setting model with noisy information about inflation
5and find monetary policy is more effective when there is less precise information.
Berger and Vavra (2015) document a positive relationship between exchange rate
pass through and item level price change dispersion.
Lastly, this paper also discusses the effects of first and second moment oil price
shocks on the economy. Bloom (2009) and Stein and Stone (2014) also use oil shocks as
a plausibly exogenous source of volatility on investment decisions. Studying the effects
of oil shocks themselves, Blanchard and Gali (2008) construct a model with nominal
rigidities in price and wage setting, where firms and consumers use oil to study the
declining role of oil in the US economy over time. They find that a combination of
a decrease in wage rigidities, increase in monetary policy credibility, and a decrease
in oil consumption for both firms and consumers have contributed to the decrease
in importance of oil price shocks. Clark and Terry (2010) use a Bayesian vector
autoregression framework and show that energy price pass through has declined over
time starting from the 1970’s. Chen (2008) also studies oil price pass through into
inflation across countries using a time varying pass through coefficient. She finds a
long run pass through of 16 percent for the US over the period of 1970 to 2006, and
a short run pass through of slightly less than 1 percent over one quarter. Jo (2012)
uses a VAR with stochastic volatility to study the effects of oil price volatility on real
economic activity and finds that an increase in oil price volatility decreases industrial
production.
1.2 Data Sources and Methods
1.2.1 Micro-Price Data
This paper constructs industry level measures of relevant price statistics using
confidential item level micro-data underlying the producer price index from the Bu-
6reau of Labor Statistics1. The micro-level data starts in 1998 and extends through
20142. Each month around 100,000 prices are collected from about 25,000 reporters.
Prices are collected for the entire U.S. production sector.
Prices are collected from a survey that asks producers for the price of an item
each month. Items are sampled in a three stage procedure. The BLS first creates a
list of establishments within an industry. The second stage is selecting price forming
units within each industry, which are created by clustering establishments. The third
and final stage is selecting specific items within a price forming unit to sample. The
BLS uses a probabilistic technique to select items within a price setting unit, where
items are weighted proportional to the value of the category within the unit3.
I restrict the pricing data to a subset of items within the PPI. Only manufacturing
industries are included which enables the study of price setting in markets where
goods are not homogeneous and firms have some price setting power4. Gopinath and
Itskhoki (2010) make the same restriction in their study of international producer
pricing data. Manufacturing industries are also a setting where oil is used as an
input for production. This leaves 81 four digit industries in the micro-level data
sample. While the PPI collects data on finished goods, intermediate goods, and
crude materials, only finished goods products are used in the construction of these
statistics. Aggregate price statistics are calculated by first constructing an item level
unweighted statistic within each four digit NAICS industry. Industry price statistics
are then aggregated using value added weights to construct the weighted mean of
1The data set has been studied before in Gilchrist et al. (2015), Goldberg and Hellerstein (2009),
Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) along with several other
papers.
2The BLS collects this price data from the view of the firm rather than the consumer, thus price
collected is the revenue received by a producer and does not include sales or excise taxes. This is in
contrast to the CPI which is the out of pocket expenditure for a consumer for a given item.
3Further details about the BLS sampling process is in appendix A.1.3.
4This includes goods that have a two digit NAICS code of 31, 32, or 33. However it excludes all
items in NAICS 324, Petroleum and Coal manufacturing industry, as these industries view oil price
volatility as both profit and cost volatility.
7Figure 1·3: Monthly Standard Deviation of Price Changes
Note: Data is seasonally adjusted with X-12 seasonal filter and presented as 6 month moving
average.
each price setting moment5.
The main focus of the empirical section of the paper is to study the effect of
oil price volatility on producer price change dispersion. Dispersion is measured as
either the standard deviation of price changes or the interquartile range of price
changes. Producer price change dispersion is measured at the industry-month level as
PriceDispj,t =
√
1
I
I∑
i=1
(dpi,j,t − di,j,t)2, where i indexes items within industry j during
month t. Price change dispersion is calculated using only non-zero price changes6.
5This is the similar to the method Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) use to construct PPI price
statistics. They first took the average price statistic within an item group, then took a median across
item groups.
6Price change dispersion is typically constructed using only non-zero price changes such as in
Vavra (2014), Berger and Vavra (2015), Luo and Villar (2015). Similar results are obtained however
when including zeros in the standard deviation of price changes measure and results are in appendix
A.1.8.
8Moment Freq Avg Size Frac Up Frac Small SD Kurt
CPI 0.11 0.08 0.65 0.12 0.08 6.4
PPI 0.15 0.07 0.60 0.22 0.13 15.0
Table 1.1: Consumer and Producer Price Index Moments
Note: All CPI moments calculated for 1988-2012 from Vavra (2014) except for fraction of small
price changes which is calculated for 1977-2014 from Luo and Villar (2015). PPI moments calculated
for 1998-2014 are author’s calculation. Small price changes are defined as |dpi,t| < 0.01.
The interquartile range is calculated for the same set of item level price changes within
an industry at time t.
Figure 1·3 shows aggregate price change standard deviation during the 1998 to
2014 data sample. It shows there is a large amount of variation over time ranging from
0.09 during 1999 up to 0.15 during 2003. During the Great Recession the dispersion
measure increased from 0.13 to 0.14, an increase of 7%. This stands in contrast with
Berger and Vavra (2015) who find the IQR of price change dispersion nearly doubles
from 0.09 to 0.17 in the international producer price data set7.
To further substantiate the similarities between consumer and producer prices,
table 1.1 shows price statistics for both the CPI and the PPI. The most notable
difference between the two data sets is that there are more small price changes in the
PPI than the CPI, which increases the kurtosis of the price change distribution in
the PPI8. The correlation between the monthly inflation measures of consumer prices
and producer prices is 0.8 over the 1998 to 2014 time period9. Temporary sales are
not common in the PPI, so sales filtering techniques are not applied.
7I find that the IQR of price change dispersion increases from 0.07 to 0.09 during the Great
Recession.
8Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) show that there is a high correlation between the frequency of
price change within narrow item groups between the CPI and PPI data.
9A comparison of the CPI and PPI inflation rates are shown in appendix A.1.9.
91.2.2 Oil Prices
I measure oil prices using the average monthly West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
spot price of oil, a particular grade of light and sweet crude oil traded in Cushing,
Oklahoma. The WTI oil price is beneficial to use because it is available at daily
frequency, and allows construction of within month volatility of oil prices. I argue
that oil price and volatility movements are plausibly exogenous to disaggregated US
industries. Evidence in favor of this is that many large price movements can be traced
to events that are unrelated to the US. Rather they can be explained by events in
large oil producing regions such as the Middle East or South America, or changes in
demand elsewhere in the world.
This section will briefly summarize the evolution of oil price changes over time10.
There was a spike in the price and volatility of oil during late 2002 and 2003 related
to the Venezuelan oil strike from December 2002 to February 2003 and the Iraq war
in 2003. The nominal price of oil then increased over 350 percent from 2003 until
the middle of 2008, and Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2008b) attribute this to an
increase in demand from Asia. Oil prices plummeted from $134 in June 2008 to $34
in February 2009 due to anticipation of a global recession while oil volatility more
than doubled during the associated period. Another spike in oil prices and volatility
occurred in 2011 and is associated with the Libyan uprising.
Between June 2014 and January 2015 the price of oil fell nearly fifty percent. This
decline is attributed by Baumeister and Kilian (2015) to a decline in global activity,
as well as an increase in the supply of oil likely due to US shale production.
10Additional discussion about the potential causes of oil price changes are in appendix A.1.5.
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1.2.3 Oil Price Volatility
This section estimates the latent oil price volatility process using three different
measures. The preferred method of measuring oil price volatility is with a stochastic
volatility model that estimates independent first and second moment shocks from the
single process for oil prices. The process will also be consistent with the modeling
section.
I assume real oil prices follow an AR(1) process with time varying volatility, where
volatility follows a mean reverting AR(1) process11. Specifically,
logP ot = ρologP
o
t−1 + e
σtνt (1.1)
σt = (1− ρσ)σ + ρσσt−1 + φνσ,t (1.2)
where {νt, νσ,t} ∼ N(0,1), and σ is the unconditional mean of σt. The shock to oil
price volatility νσ,t is assumed to be independent of the level shock νt. The postulated
oil price process is the same as in Plante and Traum (2012) or Blanchard and Gali
(2008) with time varying volatility.
The parameters are estimated using Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo meth-
ods. Due to the nonlinear interaction between the innovations to oil price shocks
and volatility, the Kalman filter cannot be used but a particle filter can evaluate the
likelihood, as proposed by Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007). Markov
Chain Monte Carlo is used to sample from the posterior distribution. Following Born
and Pfeifer (2014), a backward smoothing routine is then used to extract the historical
distribution of shocks from the model12.
However other measures of oil price volatility are also constructed for robustness.
11Nominal oil prices are deflated by the PPI finished goods index.
12Further estimation details for the stochastic volatility process are in Appendix A.1.1.
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Parameter Prior Posterior
Mean Median 95% PI
ρo Uniform(0,1) 0.999 0.999 (0.992,0.999)
ρσ Uniform(0,1) 0.887 0.9429 (0.574,0.999)
φ Uniform(0,6) 0.140 0.127 (0.053,0.276)
σ Uniform(-20,20) -2.607 -2.602 (-3.000,-2.234)
Table 1.2: Priors and Posteriors of Stochastic Volatility Oil Process
Note: Stochastic Volatility priors for real oil price process with time varying volatility. Process
estimated using monthly WTI data from 1986 to 2014.
A GARCH model of volatility is estimated, and the extracted volatility series shows
that the two methods measure the same underlying process. Realized volatility is
constructed from within month daily oil price returns. While this is a noisier volatility
process it has a significant correlation with the other volatility series. The high
correlation between the three measures of oil price volatility shows that they are
extracting a common volatility factor that underlies oil price movements.
The conditional heteroskedasticity of oil prices in the estimated GARCH(1,1)
model of oil prices has both significant autoregressive and moving average compo-
nents. Complete description of the results is in the appendix. The GARCH volatility
series is noisier than the stochastic volatility series, but they have a correlation of
0.74 between 1998 and 2014. GARCH volatility shows a large increase in volatility
during 2009 that is also present in the stochastic volatility measure.
The final measure of volatility for robustness is the realized volatility of daily oil
price returns. The monthly realized volatility value is constructed as:
RVt =
√√√√√ N∑
n=1
(dpn − dpt)2
N − 1 (1.3)
where dpn is the log difference in daily oil prices between days and n indexes number
of trading days in month t. This volatility measure differs significantly from the
extracted stochastic volatility and GARCH processes. The realized volatility series is
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Variable Mean Median Standard Dev Max Min
Stochastic Vol 0.0763 0.0724 0.0222 0.1730 0.0416
GARCH Vol 0.0785 0.0736 0.0191 0.1980 0.0582
Realized Vol 0.0580 0.0510 0.0332 0.2566 0.0170
∆log(P ot ) 0.0042 0.0119 0.0820 0.2130 -0.3132
Table 1.3: Oil Price Summary Statistics
Note: Summary statistics for monthly WTI real oil prices over 1998:M1-2014:M12. Volatility
measures are the standard deviation of each oil price volatility measure.
more volatile than the other two because it only relies on within month variation in
oil prices without any between month smoothing mechanism due to autocorrelation
in the oil price volatility process. However, there is still a significant correlation
between realized volatility and the other two volatility series, implying that all three
are extracting a similar latent volatility process for oil prices13.
Figure 1·4 compares the three oil volatility measures over time, while table 1.3
shows oil price summary statistics during the 1998 to 2014 period. There is a spike
in volatility in all three measures during the last months of 2002 and early 2003 that
occurs during the Venezuelan oil strike and beginning of the Iraq War. Between
March 2008 and December 2008, stochastic volatility more than doubles from 0.078
to 0.172. GARCH and realized volatility have similar large increases during the same
time period. GARCH volatility rises from 0.06 to 0.15, and realized volatility nearly
quadruples from 0.04 to 0.15. All three series also have large increases during the
second half of 2014.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Oil Price Pass Through
Before moving to the main analysis, I examine the pass through of oil prices to
producer prices to show that oil price inflation affects producer price setting behavior.
13Over the period 1998 to 2014, the correlation between stochastic volatility and GARCH volatility
is 0.74, while the correlation between stochastic volatility and realized volatility is 0.66. GARCH
volatility and realized volatility of oil prices have a correlation of 0.42.
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Figure 1·4: Oil Volatility
Note: The thick dotted red line shows the extracted stochastic volatility of oil prices, eσt , while
the solid black line shows the GARCH volatility, σt. The thin dotted gray line shows within month
realized volatility of daily oil prices.
I estimate the pass through equation:
pij,t = αj +
12∑
i=0
bi
(
∆logP ot−i
)
+ j,t (1.4)
where pij,t is monthly producer price inflation for a NAICS 4 industry j. αj are
industry fixed effects and ∆logP ot are monthly changes in the spot price of oil. The
regression includes 12 months of lagged oil price changes14. The results are in table
1.4.
The short run pass through is the coefficient b0, the impact of a change of oil
prices on producer prices during the same month15. The coefficient is positive and
14Additional oil price lags do not substantially change the results.
15Restricting oil prices to pass through with at least a one month lag does not change the results.
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Figure 1·5: Stochastic Oil Volatility and Real Oil Price
Note: WTI nominal monthly oil price deflated by PPI finished goods index on right vertical axis
and stochastic volatility, eσt , on the left vertical axis.
Short Run Pass Through Long Run Pass Through
0.010∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.017)
Table 1.4: Pass Through Regression
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. Number of observa-
tion=10,106. Number of industries=66. R2 = 0.06. Robust asymptotic standard errors reported in
parentheses are clustered at the industry level: * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
statistically significant. Given that the average industry in the sample has an oil
share of 1.6%, the size of the pass through is large. It can be interpreted as 1.0% of
a change in oil price inflation is passed through to producer prices.
The long run coefficient is
∑12
i=0 bi, and implies that 8.6% of a change in oil prices
The short run pass through coefficient is b1 = 0.012
∗∗∗ and the long run pass through coefficient is∑12
i=1 bi = 0.076
∗∗∗.
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is passed through over a year16. Oil prices can pass through not only through a
direct cost channel, but also through changes in other material costs due to input
output linkages. Another reason pass through can be large is due to capital-energy
complementarities which can generate oil price effects above their cost share as argued
by Atkeson and Kehoe (1999).
These pass through estimates imply short run and long run pass through of oil
prices to industry inflation for manufacturing industries17. This is important because
the pass through estimates imply industries price setting behavior reacts to changes
in the price of oil, and could be impacted by the volatility of oil prices. In the next
section I will show that volatility of oil prices affects dispersion of industry price
changes.
1.3.2 Price Change Dispersion and Oil Price Volatility
As motivating evidence before exploiting heterogeneity in industry oil share, I
first estimate the time series relationship between price change dispersion and oil
price volatility. Oil price volatility is a common cost volatility shock to firms. The
time series relationship does not control for all common shocks and is not causal.
Variation in industry price change dispersion over time allows me to run the following
regression:
Yj,t = η ∗∆log(P ot−1) + λ ∗ σt−1 + γ′Xj,t + αj + jt (1.5)
where t indexes time and j indexes industry. This specification maps a change in
oil price inflation and oil volatility into the average change in price change standard
deviation after controlling for industry heterogeneity with the use of fixed effects and
movements in aggregate financial conditions and volatility. The results for the three
16Exchange rate pass through regressions generally find long run coefficients close to 0.3.
17Adding additional lags to the pass through regression does not substantively change the results.
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measures of oil price volatility are in table 1.5.
The regression controls for macroeconomic fluctuations in financial constraints
and idiosyncratic volatility. Economy wide financial conditions are controlled for
with the excess bond premium measure of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), while a
broad measure of volatility is controlled for with the VIX index. Industry fixed ef-
fects control for time invariant differences between industries and average industry
item level inflation rate and industrial production changes are included to control
for movements in industry price and production. The unit of observation is monthly
price change dispersion at the 4-digit NAICS level. This level of industry aggrega-
tion includes on average nearly 500 items at the industry month level, allowing me
to construct reasonably precise price change dispersion numbers while limiting the
amount of heterogeneity within an industry. The dependent variable is the standard
deviation of price change conditional on adjustment. Similar results are obtained
using the interquartile range of price changes and are in appendix A.1.8.
Column 1 shows results for the stochastic volatility of oil prices. Oil price infla-
tion and volatility are included with a one month lag which reduces the potential
endogeneity. The second row shows the coefficient of interest for oil price volatility.
The results show that increases in oil price volatility increase the average producer
price change dispersion. A one standard deviation increase in oil price volatility is
0.022, which implies that the average industry price change dispersion will increase
by 0.005. The unweighted average price change standard deviation is 0.109; the es-
timate implies an increase of 4% in price change dispersion for the average industry.
Excess bond premium and the VIX measure of volatility do not affect price change
dispersion in this regression. The fact that the VIX index does not predict producer
price change dispersion shows that oil price volatility is not simply correlated over
time with other measures of volatility but rather has further explanatory power in
17
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Price Change
Volatility Measure Stochastic Vol Realized Vol GARCH Vol
(1) (2) (3)
∆log(P ot−1) 0.010 0.019 0.011
(0.009) (0.090) (0.009)
σt−1 0.210∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.031) (0.048)
pij,t−1 0.111 0.114 0.122
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
∆IPj,t 0.002 -0.004 -0.005
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
EBPt−1 0.003 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
VIXt−1 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 63 63 63
N 10,946 10,946 10,946
Table 1.5: Producer Price Change Dispersion and Macroeconomic
Shocks
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. Robust asymptotic standard
errors reported in parentheses are double clustered at the industry-month level: * p < .10; ** p < .05;
and *** p < .01.
producer pricing. Oil price inflation and lagged industry inflation are positive but
insignificant. Bachmann et al. (2013) argue that changes in unforecasted production
can affect the frequency of price change, however changes in industrial production are
negative and insignificant in predicting price change dispersion.
Column 2 shows the regression results with the realized volatility of oil prices, and
it shows that within month volatility of oil prices is also correlated with increased
producer price change standard deviation. Realized volatility of oil prices is on a
different scale than stochastic volatility, and a one standard deviation increase in
realized volatility implies an increase of 0.003 in average price change dispersion. The
excess bond premium is positive and significant which implies an increase in price
change dispersion in the producer price data. This result could be explained by the
model of Gilchrist et al. (2015), who argue that more financially constrained firms are
likely to increase prices while financially unconstrained firms will lower them during
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periods of financial crisis in order to increase market share.
GARCH volatility results are in column 3, and it shows the same pattern that ex-
ists with stochastic and realized volatility. Periods of high GARCH oil price volatility
are related to increased price change dispersion for producer prices. These regression
results show that all measures of oil price volatility increase producer price change dis-
persion, and price change dispersion is related to changes in the underlying volatility
of oil prices.
The previous regressions shows that producer price change dispersion is correlated
with oil price volatility over time. However it does not identify how changes in oil
price volatility impact price change dispersion due to potential omitted variables.
In order to identify this relationship I will exploit heterogeneity in oil usage across
industries to construct industry specific oil demand variables.
1.3.3 Industry Specific Oil Volatility
I now construct industry specific oil demand variables in order to identify the
effects of oil volatility on industry level producer price setting behavior. The empirical
strategy uses variation in oil price and volatility interacted with a long run share of
oil that represents the importance of oil in each industry’s cost function. The idea
behind the demand variables is to exploit the heterogeneity in long run oil usage,
which is a measure of the importance of oil prices from the cost channel. Industries
that use more oil should respond more strongly to oil price shocks than industries
that are not as reliant on oil. The industry specific oil demand variables allow me to
control for any common shocks over time and any time invariant differences between
industries, which enables identification of oil price volatility shocks on price setting
behavior.
The oil demand variables are similar to those used in Shea (1993), Perotti (2008),
or Nekarda and Ramey (2011) who study the effects of fiscal policy on industries. The
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Input-Output tables contain information on the dollar amount of oil used as well as
industry production. A long run oil usage sensitivity is constructed by averaging over
the time dimension of the data to remove dependence on the current year’s oil price.
There is substantial variation in experiences after an oil volatility shock due to the
heterogeneity in oil usage across industries. An industry that does not use oil would
be unlikely to experience any immediate changes in costs due to oil price volatility
changes, while an industry with a large share of oil will need to adjust prices by a
larger amount to reset their optimal price. Constructing industry specific oil prices
variables allows use of industry and time fixed effects, thereby studying the partial
equilibrium effects of an aggregate volatility shock. This partial equilibrium effect
allows me to study the mechanism through which volatility shocks affect price setting
behavior.
Benchmark IO use tables are published every five years at a detailed 6-digit NAICS
industry. The tables from 1997, 2002, and 2007 are used for this study. An industry’s
oil sensitivity in year t is given by
so,j,t =
Nominal Dollars Spent of Oil Input Industry j in Year t
Nominal Dollars Value Added Industry j in Year t
(1.6)
where j indexes an industry18. This sensitivity to oil usage is motivated by an indus-
try’s oil share of production. However this measure could be correlated with industry
technological change, due to substitution towards or away from oil due to changes in
oil price. Therefore in order to reduce the short run effects of oil price changes from
this sensitivity measure, the share of oil is averaged over the time dimension of the
IO tables:
so,j =
T∑
t=1
so,j,t
T
(1.7)
18The oil producing sector is defined as NAICS 324111, Petroleum Refining.
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Figure 1·6: Average price change dispersion for high and low oil
share industries.
Note: Average price change dispersion for top and bottom 10% of industries in each month. Oil
volatility is the extracted stochastic volatility of oil prices, eσt . Data is demeaned, seasonally
adjusted with the X-12 filter, and then presented as a 6 month moving average. The shaded areas
represent NBER-dated recessions.
Oil demand variables for oil price change and volatility are then constructed by in-
teracting the long run oil share, so,j, with oil price volatility or oil price inflation
19.
These oil demand variables are in the spirit of ‘Bartik’ style measures, an interaction
between a predefined share of oil usage and aggregate changes in oil price or volatility
within narrowly defined manufacturing industries. The idea behind this measure is
that global changes in oil price and volatility differentially impacted industries be-
cause of long run oil usage technology. The sensitivity, so,j, is a directional measure
of the degree to which oil price and volatility movements will affect price setting
19Using the pre-sample oil usage from 1997 does not change any results. Full results using this
measure are in appendix A.1.8.
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behavior.
Figure 1·6 illustrates the identification and previews the main result by comparing
the price change dispersion time series for high and low oil share industries with the
stochastic volatility of oil prices. I define the high and low oil share sectors as the
10% of industries with the highest or lowest oil share each period. The correlation
between the high oil share sector average price change dispersion and stochastic oil
price volatility is 0.423, while the correlation between the low oil share sector average
price change dispersion and oil price volatility is only 0.073. This figure suggests that
industries that are more oil intensive have greater price change dispersion during
periods of high oil price volatility.
However the correlation between price change dispersion and oil price volatility
for high and low oil share industries does not control for aggregate shocks or cyclical
changes in production by industry. Using the oil demand variables I control for both
industry differences and time variation in common shocks such as aggregate volatility
or financial constraints through the use of time fixed effects. The main regression of
interest is the specification:
Yj,t = η ∗ (so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1)) + λ ∗ (so,j ∗ σt−1) + γ′Xj,t + αj + αt + jt (1.8)
where Yj,t is the price change dispersion measure. The coefficient of interest is λ,
which is the marginal effect of an increase in oil price volatility for an industry with oil
share so,j. Xj,t are a vector of control variables that can influence inflation dispersion
. Controls include industrial production growth and industry inflation. Identification
of volatility comes from variation across time within an industry for a given so,j.
The main results using the stochastic volatility measure are in table 1.6. GARCH
volatility and realized volatility oil price measure results are in appendix A.1.8. They
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have similar implications.
The identifying assumption is that the interaction of oil price volatility and oil
share is not correlated with unobserved shocks to an individual industry. Separate
identification of oil price and oil volatility comes from the fact that oil prices and
volatility do not move together. The exogeneity of the variable hinges on each industry
being a price taker in the global oil market, as well as the degree to which oil usage
is irreversible in the short run. However oil is likely to be characterized by large
amounts of specific capital or irreversible investment as a material input or energy
source which make it difficult to quickly substitute away from.
The regression results show that after controlling for differences across time and
between industries, an increase in oil price volatility increases price change disper-
sion for industries that are more oil dependent. Changes in industrial production
are negatively correlated with price change dispersion in aggregate data, but at the
industry level I find no relationship between the two measures. Industry specific oil
price inflation has no estimated effect on price change dispersion.
Oil price volatility more than doubled from 0.071 to 0.144 between December 2007
and September 2008. The associated change in the average price change standard
deviation was from 0.125 to 0.133. The estimate from column 2 implies that oil price
volatility could explain 44% of the average observed price change dispersion increase
after controlling for oil price inflation and other observables.
Frequency of price change is also an important component of aggregate price
flexibility and therefore monetary policy effectiveness. I find no evidence that price
change frequency reacts to changes in oil price volatility. The full results in appendix
A.1.8.
It has been argued by Gilchrist et al. (2015) that financial frictions impacted prices
differentially during the financial crisis in 2008. Given that this is the same period
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Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) 0.086 0.078 -0.002 0.022
(0.096) (0.097) (0.086) (0.082)
so,j ∗ σt−1 3.033∗∗∗ 3.059∗∗∗ 3.088∗∗∗ 2.928∗∗∗
(0.839) (0.851) (0.946) (0.891)
pij,t 0.081 0.085 0.086
(0.116) (0.112) (0.110)
∆IPj,t 0.001 -0.002
(0.014) (0.015)
PriceDispj,t−1 0.066∗∗∗
(0.016)
so ∗ σt−1 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 81 81 63 63
N 13,606 13,606 10,946 10,939
Table 1.6: Industry Specific Oil Demand Variables Regression
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. The dependent variable is
the standard deviation of price change of a 4-digit NAICS industry in the manufacturing sector. All
industries within the oil producing NAICS 324 sector are excluded. so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) and so,j ∗σt−1
are the industry specific oil demand variables using monthly WTI real price of oil. pij,t is the average
item level inflation rate for industry j. σt is the extracted stochastic volatility measure of oil price
volatility. PriceDispj,t−1 is the lagged industry price change dispersion. so ∗σt−1 is the transformed
coefficient for a marginal change in oil price volatility for an average industry with oil share of
0.016. Robust asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry
level: * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
when the largest movements in oil price volatility occurred, an indicator variable is
included to examine if the large changes in oil prices and volatility had differential
effects during the financial crisis period of 2008. Column 1 of Table 1.7 shows that
even with the doubling of oil volatility during 2008, oil price volatility has the same
effect on price change dispersion within and outside of the crisis period.
As an additional robustness exercise, column 2 shows the results using a 3-digit
NAICS classification of industry and the stochastic volatility measure of oil price
volatility. The results show that increased oil price volatility increases price change
dispersion. The specifications in columns 3 and 4 use GARCH and realized volatil-
ity of oil prices respectively, and both imply statistically significant increases in the
standard deviation of price changes.
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Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) ∗ [Crisis = 0] 0.131
(0.085)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) ∗ [Crisis = 1] -0.171
(0.360)
so,j ∗ σt−1 ∗ [Crisis = 0] 2.763∗∗∗
(0.866)
so,j ∗ σt−1 ∗ [Crisis = 1] 3.000∗∗∗
(0.963)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) -0.025 0.014 -0.052 0.093 -0.009
(0.206) (0.092) (0.115) (0.130) (0.095)
so,j ∗ σt−1 2.551∗∗ 1.766∗∗∗ 2.676∗∗∗ 5.381∗∗∗ 1.983∗∗∗
(1.007) (0.586) (0.980) (1.356) (0.735)
pij,t 0.081 -0.155 0.080 0.085 0.143 0.074
(0.117) (0.120) (0.117) (0.116) (0.195) (0.118)
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 81 20 81 81 80 81
N 13,606 3,176 13,606 13,606 7,543 13,606
Table 1.7: Robustness Analysis
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. Columns (1) and (2) use
the stochastic volatility measure of oil price volatility. Crisis year indicator is defined as 1 during
2008 and 0 otherwise. This is the same crisis definition timing as Gilchrist et al. (2015). Column
(2) defines an industry at the 3-digit NAICS level. Column (3) uses the realized volatility measure
of oil price volatility with 4-digit NAICS industries. Column (4) uses the GARCH measure of oil
price volatility with 4-digit NAICS industries. Column (5) uses the stochastic volatility measure
of oil price volatility with the 4-digit NAICS industries but restricts the sample from 1998:M1 to
2007:M12. Column (6) uses Brent Crude oil prices and stochastic volatility with 4-digit NAICS
industries. Robust asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry
level: * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
Column 5 shows the baseline specification using stochastic volatility of oil prices
but restricts the sample to the 1998 through 2007 period, before the financial crisis
and the zero lower bound on interest rates. Column 6 uses the Brent Crude oil
price and it’s stochastic volatility rather than the WTI oil price. These results show
that greater oil price volatility implies higher price change dispersion both during the
restricted sample, and using an alternative oil price.
1.3.4 Within Firm Price Change Dispersion
A possible identification concern with the main industry regression is that there
is differential oil usage across firms within an industry. As a robustness exercise to
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address this concern, I include firm level fixed effects and identify the effect of oil
price volatility within a firm across industries. Item level price change dispersion is
constructed at the firm level over 2005-2014; that is the standard deviation of price
changes within a month for a firm indexed by i20. This allows me to control for time
invariant firm specific differences using firm fixed effects, such as differences in oil
share within an industry. Specifically I estimate the following regression:
Yi,j,t = η ∗ (so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1)) + λ ∗ (so,j ∗ σt−1) + γ′Xj,t + αi + αt + ijt (1.9)
The regression is linking item level price change dispersion within an firm to industry
specific changes in oil prices and oil volatility while controlling for industry inflation.
Firm and time fixed effects control for differences between firms and common aggre-
gate shocks over time. The coefficient λ is the average firm level response to oil price
volatility for an industry with an oil share of so,j. Results are in table 1.8.
The results show that using only within firm variation, price change dispersion
increases more within oil intensive industries during periods of high oil price volatility.
Average industry level price change dispersion is greater than average firm level price
change dispersion, causing the decrease in coefficient magnitude21. These regressions
show that the relationship between oil price volatility and price change dispersion is
robust to controlling for time invariant firm level heterogeneity.
The empirical analysis provides evidence that oil price volatility, a common cost
volatility shock, is positively related to price change dispersion at the industry and
firm level. Industries that use more oil exhibit greater price change dispersion in
response to high oil volatility. Additionally, the average price change dispersion of a
20Firm level analysis is conducted only over 2005-2014 due to a change in firm level identification
in 2005.
21The average firm level non-zero price change standard deviation in the sample is 0.046 while the
average industry level non-zero price change standard deviation is 0.112.
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Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) 0.016 0.017 0.056 0.056
(0.058) (0.058) (0.088) (0.088)
so,j ∗ σt−1 1.317∗∗∗ 1.304∗∗∗ 1.567∗∗∗ 1.563∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.269) (0.491) (0.489)
pij,t−1 -0.104∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.023)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 20,162 20,162 4,721 4,721
N 202,938 202,938 50,930 50,930
Table 1.8: Producer Price Change Dispersion and Macroeconomic
Shocks
Note: Sample period: 2005:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. Columns (1) and (2) include
all firm-month observations with at least two price changes, while columns (3) and (4) restrict the
sample to be firm-month observations with at least five price changes. Robust asymptotic standard
errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level: * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
firm within an industry with high oil usage is greater than the average firm within
a low oil usage industry. This suggests that it is not due to heterogeneity within
industries, but rather, is due to a common response to the aggregate shock.
Price change dispersion is a measure of aggregate price level flexibility, with greater
price change dispersion implying less flexibility. The next chapter will examine the re-
lationship between oil price volatility and price change dispersion in a state dependent
general equilibrium model of price setting.
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter shows that increased oil price volatility increases price change disper-
sion. I do this by showing that the average industry price change dispersion is greater
during periods of high oil price volatility. Then by exploiting the heterogeneity across
industries in oil usage, I show that the increase in price change dispersion is larger
for sectors with more oil usage.
Price change dispersion is a key measure of monetary non-neutrality. The em-
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pirical results in this chapter show that prices do not become more flexible during
periods of high aggregate volatility, contrary to previous results in the literature. This
suggests that monetary policy effectiveness does not fall during periods of increased
aggregate volatility.
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Chapter 2
Price Setting and Volatility: Monetary
Policy Effectiveness
2.1 Introduction
Volatility has been argued to be a key contributor to business cycles and firm deci-
sion making, such as in the seminal paper of Bloom (2009). Models with time varying
volatility generally show that policy effectiveness, both fiscal and monetary, falls dur-
ing periods of increased idiosyncratic volatility. This chapter asks, is monetary policy
effectiveness is a function of aggregate volatility in the economy?
This chapter constructs a general equilibrium price setting model with fixed costs
of price adjustment that matches the micro-pricing facts in order to quantify the
effects of monetary policy during periods of increased aggregate volatility. Changes
in volatility have two mechanisms through which they affect firm price setting in a
model with fixed costs of adjustment, a real options effect and a volatility effect.
The real options effect increases the region of inactivity in the model, by pushing the
action and inaction bands outward, thereby decreasing frequency of price adjustment.
The volatility effect increases the variance of the common aggregate shock that affects
firms. Increases in volatility to a common shock imply that larger shocks will affect
firms, but the resultant price changes will be synchronized in the direction of the
common cost shock which decreases price change dispersion. This stands in contrast
to changes in idiosyncratic volatility, where the volatility effect pushes more price
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changes in both directions and increases price change dispersion.
I first show that the empirical relationship between price change dispersion and
oil price volatility is particularly surprising in the context of a modern menu cost
model similar to Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Midrigan (2011). This type of model
with a fixed menu cost predicts decreased price change dispersion in response to an
oil price volatility shock, and the dispersion falls more for sectors with greater oil
usage. An increase in oil price volatility is a common shock, and this causes more
prices to change and move in the direction of the cost shock which decreases price
change dispersion.
I then introduce heterogeneous and random menu costs to the model as in Dotsey
et al. (1999) or Luo and Villar (2015) and show that it is able to match the empirical
findings. Firms draw menu costs from a non-degenerate distribution, which increases
the randomness of which prices will change. Firms have a substantial probability of
a large menu cost such that the price will almost never change, which attenuates the
price response to a more volatile common shock. During a period of increased oil
price volatility some price changes will be more extreme, but due to the firm specific
random menu cost a substantial portion of price changes will be reacting to their
idiosyncratic productivity shock which decreases the synchronization of price change
direction in response the common shock. This feature also limits the increase in price
change frequency, by having some fixed costs be large enough such that a firm would
never choose to change the price that period1.
The model is then used to quantify the effectiveness of monetary policy to stim-
ulate consumption during a period of increased oil price volatility. I find that in
the general equilibrium model the graphical intuition shown in Figures 1·1 and 1·2
holds, and that monetary policy is only slightly less effective. The model shows that
1I focus on price change dispersion in the analysis because I find no evidence that the frequency
of price change reacts to oil price volatility. This further supports a model that limits the reaction
of frequency to aggregate volatility shocks.
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monetary policy’s ability to stimulate consumption on impact of the shock falls by
less than 1% during a one standard deviation increase in oil price volatility. The
small decrease in ability to generate real effects is due to an increase in price change
frequency, which balances out the increase in effectiveness due to the increase in price
change dispersion. The slight decrease is in comparison to the counterfactual fixed
menu cost model, which would suggest that monetary policy effectiveness falls by over
8%. More prices are changing because of the large oil price shocks, which enables
them to simultaneously incorporate the increase in money.
Aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility can both increase price change dispersion,
but they have different implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy. My
results suggest that policy makers need to consider the source of volatility, aggregate
or idiosyncratic, in order to effectively manage the tradeoff between inflation and
output stabilization.
Section 2.2 presents and calibrates a quantitative price setting model with first
and second moment oil price shocks. Section 2.3 discusses model implications for
monetary policy effectiveness during periods of heightened oil price volatility. Section
2.4 discusses other models of price setting. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
The paper most closely related is Vavra (2014). He constructs a standard menu
cost model with second moment shocks to idiosyncratic productivity in order to show
that during periods of high volatility both price change dispersion and frequency in-
crease. The paper shows that a model without second moment shocks is inconsistent
with the countercyclical processes for aggregate price change frequency and disper-
sion. The model in this chapter differs by examining a shock to a common source of
volatility, oil price, rather than an increase in idiosyncratic volatility.
This paper contributes to the literature on state dependent models of price setting
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consistent with micro-data facts by introducing a new empirical fact on the relation-
ship between price change dispersion and oil price volatility. The model of Golosov
and Lucas (2007) features a very strong selection effect, where only large price changes
occur. Many papers such as Midrigan (2011), Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), and
Karadi and Reiff (2016) have since argued that the selection effect is weaker than in
the Golosov and Lucas model. In particular, Midrigan (2011) introduces leptokurtic
productivity shocks, which increases the dispersion of price changes. This reduces
the mass of prices that would change for a small monetary shock, increasing mon-
etary non-neutrality. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) introduce real rigidities into
the menu cost model through a multi-sector model. Heterogeneity amongst sectors
in frequency and average size of price change increases monetary non-neutrality by a
factor of three. Karadi and Reiff (2016) show that idiosyncratic productivity shocks
that feature stochastic volatility better matches the response to large VAT changes,
and argue that this model would feature a degree on non-neutrality between that of
the Midrigan model and Golosov and Lucas model. Luo and Villar (2015) document
that the price change distribution skewness increases as the rate of inflation increases
and argue that the previous set of models are unable to match this empirical fact.
They augment the model with random menu costs to increase the randomness of price
changes in order to fit this fact.
2.2 Menu Cost Model
This section presents a generalized menu cost model of price setting in order to
quantify the effects of volatility on monetary non-neutrality. The baseline quantitative
menu cost model follows Golosov and Lucas (2007) with a fixed menu cost. It includes
the leptokurtic productivity shocks as in Midrigan (2010) and a small probability of
a free price change such as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2010). Oil is modeled as a
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non-produced input in the firm production function with an exogenous real price as in
Blanchard and Gali (2008), and a time varying second moment to represent volatility
shocks.
In the fixed menu cost model an oil price volatility shock predicts lower price
change dispersion on impact of an oil price volatility shock due to the selection effect
of the firms which choose to change prices. The selection effect states that the prices
that are most likely to change are those that are furthest from their optimal price. The
common oil price shock pushes more price changes in one direction, which decreases
price change dispersion.
The generalized price setting model nests a random menu cost model, which re-
duces the selection effect by issuing firms a random heterogeneous menu cost each
period. The random menu costs imply firms have a differential likelihood of chang-
ing prices based on the menu cost they receive. This mechanism alters the mix of
price changes and enables the model to match the positive relationship between the
common cost volatility shock and price change dispersion.
Monetary policy effectiveness is then examined during periods of high and low
oil price volatility. In the counterfactual fixed menu cost model there is a greater
tradeoff between output and inflation when oil price volatility is high, due to increased
price flexibility. The random menu cost model, which matches the positive empirical
relationship between oil price volatility and price change dispersion, implies near
constant monetary non-neutrality in response to changes in aggregate cost shock
volatility.
2.2.1 Households
A model of price setting with first and second moment shocks to oil prices is now
presented. Households maximize current expected utility, given by
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Et
∞∑
τ=0
βt
[
log(Ct+τ )− ωLt+τ
]
(2.1)
They consume a continuum of differentiated products indexed by z. The composite
consumption good Ct is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of these differentiated goods,
Ct =
[ 1∫
0
ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(2.2)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods.
Households decide each period how much to consume of each differentiated good.
For any given level of spending in time t, households choose the consumption bundle
that yields the highest level of the consumption index Ct. This implies that household
demand for differentiated good z is
ct(z) = Ct
(
pt(z)
Pt
)−θ
(2.3)
where pt(z) is the price of good z at time t and Pt is the price level in period t,
calculated as
Pt =
[ 1∫
0
pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
(2.4)
A complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities is traded, which implies that the budget
constraint of the household is written as
PtCt + Et[Dt,t+1Bt+1] ≤ Bt +WtLt +
1∫
0
pit(z)dz + Tt (2.5)
where Bt+1 is a random variable that denotes state contingent payoffs of the portfolio
of financial assets purchased by the household in period t and sold in period t+1.
Dt+1 is the unique stochastic discount factor that prices the payoffs, Wt is the wage
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rate of the economy at time t, pit(z) is the profit of firm z in period t. Tt are lump
sum government transfers. A no ponzi game condition is assumed so that household
financial wealth is always large enough so that future income is high enough to avoid
default.
The first order conditions of the household maximization problem are
Dt,t+1 = β(
Ct+1
Ct
)
Pt
Pt+1
(2.6)
Wt
Pt
= ωLtCt (2.7)
where equation (2.6) describes the relationship between asset prices and consumption,
and (2.7) describes labor supply.
2.2.2 Firms
In the model there are a continuum of firms indexed by z. The production function
of firm z is Leontief in labor and oil to describe the lack of substitutability between
them in the short run.
yt(z) = At(z)min{Lt(z), 1
so
Ot(z)} (2.8)
where Lt(z) is labor rented from households and Ot(z) is the quantity of oil used to
produce output. Oil usage is likely to be have large amounts of specific capital or
irreversible investment in the short run, which motivates the Leontief structure.
Firm z maximizes the present discounted value of future profits
Et
∞∑
τ=0
Dt,t+τpit+τ (z) (2.9)
where profits are given by:
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pit(z) = pt(z)yt(z)−WtLt(z)−QtOt(z)− χt(z)WtIt(z) (2.10)
and Qt is the nominal price of oil. It(z) is an indicator function equal to one if the firm
changes its price and equal to zero otherwise. χt(z) is a menu cost drawn from the
distribution F (χ). In the fixed menu cost model, F (χ) is a degenerate distribution
which implies a single menu cost χ as in the model of Golosov and Lucas (2007).
The random menu cost model uses a continuous distribution where menu costs are
drawn independently each period. The next section will further explain this feature.
The final term indicates that firms must hire an extra χt(z) units of labor if they
decide to change prices with probability 1−α, or may change their price for free with
probability α2. A small probability of receiving a free price change enables the model
to generate small price changes.
Total demand for good z is given by:
yt(z) = Yt
(
pt(z)
Pt
)−θ
(2.11)
The firm problem is to maximize profits in (2.10) subject to its production func-
tion (2.8), demand for its final good product (2.11), and the behavior of aggregate
variables.
Firms supply all goods demanded at a given price. Cost minimization at a given
price implies that firms keep a constant proportion of oil input to labor input:
1
so
Ot(z) = Lt(z) (2.12)
The log of firm productivity follows a mean reverting process with leptokurtic
shocks as in Gertler and Leahy (2008) and Midrigan (2011):
2This is a reduced form mechanism representing multiproduct firms in Midrigan (2010).
36
logAt(z) =

ρalogAt−1(z) + σat(z) with probability pa
logAt−1(z) with probability 1− pa,
(2.13)
where t(z) ∼ N(0,1).
Nominal aggregate spending follows a random walk with drift:
log(St) = µ+ log(St−1) + σsηt (2.14)
where St = PtCt and ηt ∼ N(0,1). This is a standard way to model nominal aggregate
spending in a menu cost model.
The oil price process follows Blanchard and Gali (2008), by assuming that oil is
a non-produced input purchased in a world market at real price P ot . The log of P
o
t
follows an AR(1) process with time varying standard deviation:
logP ot = ρplogP
o
t−1 + e
σtνt (2.15)
where νt(z) ∼ N(0,1).
To model time varying volatility of oil prices, it is assumed that the standard
deviation of oil prices follows a mean reverting AR(1) process as estimated in section
1.2.3:
σt = (1− ρσ)σ + ρσσt−1 + φνσ,t (2.16)
where νσ,t(z) ∼ N(0,1) and σ is the unconditional mean of σt.
The state space of the firms problem is an infinite dimensional object because the
evolution of the aggregate price level depends on the joint distribution of all firms’
prices, productivity levels, and menu costs. It is assumed that firms only perceive
the evolution of the price level as a function of a small number of moments of the
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distribution as in Krusell and Smith (1998). In particular, I assume that firms use a
forecasting rule of the form:
log(
Pt
St
) = γ0+γ1logP
o
t +γ2σt+γ3log(
Pt−1
St
)+γ4(log(
Pt−1
St
)∗logP ot )+γ5(log(
Pt−1
St
)∗σt)
(2.17)
The accuracy of the rule is checked using the maximum Den Haan statistic in a
dynamic forecast3.
Using equations (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.10), (2.11), (2.12), (2.17) and market clearing
I am able to write the firm problem recursively as:
V
(
At(z),
pt−1(z)
St
, P ot , σt, χt(z), ψt
)
=
max
pt(z)
{
V N
(
At(z),
pt−1(z)
St
, P ot , σt, ψt
)
, V A
(
At(z), P
o
t , σt, χt(z), ψt
)} (2.18)
where ψt is the Krusell-Smith aggregate state describing the joint distribution of
prices, productivities, and menu costs. piRt (z) is firm z’s real profits in period t,
and DRt,t+1 is the real stochastic discount factor between periods t and t+1. Nominal
variables have been normalized by current aggregate nominal spending in the economy
to bound the state space. V N and V A are the values of not adjusting and adjusting
the current period’s relative price. The value of not adjusting is given by:
V N
(
At(z),
pt−1(z)
St
, P ot , σt, ψt
)
= piRt (
pt−1(z)
St
, At(z), P
o
t , σt, ψt)
+Et
[
DRt,t+1V
(
At+1(z),
pt−1(z)
St+1
, P ot+1, σt+1, χt(z), ψt+1
)] (2.19)
while the value of adjusting the current price is given by:
3Adding price change dispersion to the forecasting rule does not qualitatively affect the model
predictions.
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V A
(
At(z), P
o
t , σt, χt(z), ψt
)
= −χt(z)Wt
Pt
+ piRt (
pt(z)
St
, At(z), P
o
t , σt, ψt)
+Et
[
DRt,t+1V
(
At+1(z),
pt(z)
St+1
, P ot+1, σt+1, χt(z), ψt+1
)] (2.20)
The model is solved by discretization and simulated using the non-stochastic sim-
ulation method of Young (2010). Full details on the solution method are available in
the appendix section B.1.2.
2.2.3 Calibration
There are three sets of parameters that need to be calibrated in the model. The
first set are household parameters and aggregate shocks that are common to both
the fixed menu cost and random menu cost versions of the model. These parameters
are standard menu cost models. It is a monthly model so the discount rate is set to
β = (0.96)
1
12 . Household utility is assumed to be log utility in consumption and linear
disutility of labor. The elasticity of substitution is set to θ = 4 following Nakamura
and Steinsson (2010)4. The average oil share of production is set to so = 0.016, and
matches the time averaged share of production from the IO tables from 1997, 2002,
and 2007. The nominal shock process calibrates µ = 0.002 to match the difference
between the mean growth rate of nominal GDP and the mean growth rate of real
GDP over 1998 to 2012, and σs = .0037 to match the standard deviation of nominal
GDP growth over the same period. They are given in table 2.1.
The second set of parameters are for the oil price and oil price volatility processes
estimated in section 1.2.3. The oil price persistence parameter is ρv = 0.99, oil price
standard deviation σ = 0.07, oil price volatility persistence ρσ = 0.88, and oil price
volatility standard deviation is φ = 0.14. These numbers imply a high persistence for
4Other papers set higher values such as 6.8 in Vavra (2014) or 7 in Golosov and Lucas (2007),
which gives lower values of the mark up.
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Parameter Value
θ Elasticity of Substitution 4.0
β Discount Factor (0.96)
1
12
µ Growth of Nominal Spending 0.002
σs Standard Deviation of Nominal Spending 0.0037
ρa Idiosyncratic TFP Persistence 0.70
so Oil Share of Production 0.016
ρo Oil Price Persistence 0.99
σ Oil Price Standard Deviation 0.07
ρσ Oil Volatility Persistence 0.88
φ Oil Volatility Standard Deviation 0.14
Table 2.1: Common Calibration Parameters
oil price and relatively low persistence for oil price volatility.
The final set of parameters are related to the specific price setting model. These
are the persistence and standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks ρ and
σa, the probability of an idiosyncratic productivity shock pa, the cost of changing a
price χt(z), and the probability of a free price change α. These five parameters will
change depending on the particular menu cost distribution assumption. Both menu
cost models calibrate these parameters to match some salient price setting statistics
in the total PPI data.
I will now discuss the calibration for the fixed menu cost model. The persistence of
idiosyncratic productivity is set to ρ = 0.7, which matches Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008). Then the remaining four parameters χ, σa, pa, and α are set to target four
moments of the PPI data. The moments are frequency of price change, average size
of price change, standard deviation of price changes, and the fraction of small price
changes5. This model has a single point mass in the menu cost distribution that
determine the value of the fixed menu cost and is set to χ = 0.20, which implies
that firms must pay 20.0% of their monthly revenues to change a price. However
a fraction α = 0.125 of firms receive a free opportunity to change prices. This
5A small price changes is defined as |dpi,t| < 0.01.
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parameter is identified by the fraction of small price changes6. The volatility and
probability of receiving an idiosyncratic productivity shock determines the average
size and dispersion of price changes. The standard deviation of shocks is set to 0.105
and the probability of receiving a shock is set to 0.4. This enables the model to match
a large absolute average size of price changes and a large dispersion of price changes.
The distribution from which random menu costs are drawn is now explained. The
random menu costs are drawn from a transformation of an exponential distribution.
This particular model specification is taken from Luo and Villar (2015). Specifically,
random menu costs are drawn that are independent over time and across firms from
the process:
χt(z) =

0 with probability α
χ˜ with probability 1− α,
where F (k) = P (χ˜ ≤ k) = 1− e−λkξ (2.21)
The parameter λ determines the average value of the menu cost that is drawn, while
ξ determines the curvature of the distribution. Higher values of ξ imply that a firm
is less likely to draw very small or very large menu costs. These two parameters
are calibrated along with the other four parameters to match the same price setting
statistics. In particular, λ = 1.49 and ξ = 0.25. This implies a relatively high average
menu cost, and a distribution that has fat tails. There is substantial probability
that firms draw very low or very high menu costs. The persistence of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks remains set to 0.7, and the probability of a productivity shock
is 0.4. The volatility of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is set to 0.146 while the
probability of a free price change is set to 0.01.
6The pricing parameters imply that total adjustment costs in the economy are χ ∗ (Freq − α) ∗
θ−1
θ = 0.42% of revenues per month. Estimates from Levy et al. (1997) suggest that menu costs
are 0.7% of revenues, while Stella (2013) estimates menu costs to be bounded between 0.22% and
0.59%.
41
Price Setting Statistic Data MC Random MC
Frequency 0.154 0.153 0.153
Average Size of Price Change 0.071 0.096 0.091
Fraction Small Price Changes 0.215 0.143 0.152
Standard Deviation Price Changes 0.125 0.125 0.125
Fraction Price Increases 0.602 0.651 0.660
Table 2.2: Model Moments
2.2.4 Model Results
The model moments are listed in table 2.2. Both models match the frequency of
price change as well as the dispersion of price changes. The fraction of price changes
that are small is under predicted in both models, this is due to the large idiosyncratic
shocks that are needed to match the dispersion of price changes. The average size
of price changes is slightly too high, but it allows the models to match the standard
deviation of price changes. The low probability of receiving a productivity shock helps
the models increase the dispersion of price changes relative to a Golosov and Lucas
menu cost model. Due to the large oil price shocks in the model, if the probability
of a productivity shock is set too low then all price changes will be dominated by
changes in the oil price. In the random menu cost model the average size of price
changes is closer to the data, but this is at the cost of too many small price changes.
Both models have a fraction of price increases that is close to the data.
In order to test the predictions from the model against the empirical results, I com-
pute the price response on impact of an oil price volatility shock. This is a one period
impulse response to an increase in oil price volatility. For the fixed menu cost model
calibration, a one standard deviation increase in oil price volatility decreases price
change dispersion by 6.7%. The volatility effect dominates the real options effect,
increasing the frequency of price adjustment. The increase in oil price volatility cre-
ates a larger realized oil price, which increases the gap between a firm’s current price
and optimal price. The common volatility shock pushes more price changes in one
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Figure 2·1: Oil Price Volatility Shock: Fixed Menu Cost Model
Price Change Distribution
direction, decreasing price change dispersion. The strong selection effect is illustrated
in an example in figure 2·1. There is an increase in the directional synchronization of
price changes that does not occur during an increase in idiosyncratic volatility. Dur-
ing periods of increased oil price volatility, more price changes move in the direction
of the larger oil price shock, causing a decrease in price change dispersion.
The selection effect of price changes becomes more apparent during a comparative
static exercise. Table 2.3 shows the response of price change dispersion on impact to
an oil price volatility shock. The oil share of production changes while holding all
other parameters fixed from the original calibration. As the oil share of production
increases, the drop in price change dispersion becomes larger. This is due to both an
extensive and intensive change in item level inflation. Oil price changes become more
important for firms, making firms more likely to change prices as well as by a larger
amount. All price changes move in the direction of the oil price change, increasing
the synchronization of price changes and decreasing inflation dispersion.
The random menu cost model is able to reduce the selection effect of price changes,
and match the empirical relationship between price change dispersion and oil price
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so ∆ Price Dispersion ∆ Frequency
0.010 -3.84% 10.34%
0.016 -6.66% 19.40%
0.025 -9.54% 36.76%
0.050 -9.65% 85.63%
Table 2.3: Menu Cost Comparative Static Exercise
volatility. In this model, the menu costs are drawn independently across firms and
over time. This mechanism implies that prices are now a function of the random
menu cost draw as well as the state of the economy. Random menu costs attenuate
the price change reaction to a common shock and change the mix of price changes.
The evolution of the price change distribution due to an oil price volatility shock is
illustrated in figure 2·2. Due to the random menu costs that firms draw, the selection
of prices that will change depends less on the common shock as in the fixed menu
cost model, but also on the random menu cost that is drawn by each firm. During
an increase in oil price volatility, the model is buffeted by larger realized oil price
shocks. This pushes some price changes that are primarily responding to the oil price
to be more extreme. But some price changes will occur simply due to a low menu
cost draw, and will be relatively small in reaction to idiosyncratic shocks. The overall
effect is to create a more disperse price change distribution during periods of high oil
price volatility, with a fraction of price changes responding to the oil price volatility
shock but substantial mass remaining in the middle of the price change distribution.
This implies that the random menu cost model matches the empirical relationship
between price change dispersion and oil price volatility7.
A comparative static exercise is performed in table 2.4 for the random menu cost
model. Only the share of oil is varied from the original random menu cost calibration.
7Further evidence in favor of random menu costs is that it dampens the response of frequency to
oil price volatility. I found no evidence that price change frequency responds to oil price volatility
shocks.
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Figure 2·2: Oil Price Volatility Shock: Random Menu Cost Price
Change Distribution
so ∆ Price Dispersion ∆ Frequency
0.010 0.57% 2.32%
0.016 0.83% 3.46%
0.025 1.36% 5.21%
0.050 7.18% 10.18%
Table 2.4: Random Menu Cost Model Comparative Static Exercise
The table reports the increase in price change dispersion on impact of an oil price
volatility shock as the oil share of production increases. For low levels of oil usage,
an oil price volatility shock gives small increases in price change dispersion. At the
oil share of production of 1.6%, an oil price volatility shock increases price change
dispersion by 0.83%. As oil share of production increases to 2.5%, a one standard
deviation increase in oil price volatility increases price change dispersion by 1.36%.
This comparative static exercise shows that industries that use more oil have greater
price change dispersion during a period of high oil price volatility.
The model results show that a standard state dependent pricing model with a
fixed menu cost implies decreased price change dispersion on impact of an aggregate
volatility shock. Larger shocks cause prices to respond in the same direction, de-
creasing the dispersion of the price change distribution. Introducing random menu
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costs enables the model to match the effects of aggregate volatility on price setting
behavior, by attenuating the reaction to a common cost shock and changing the mix
of prices that adjust.
2.3 Implications for Monetary Policy Effectiveness
The modeling section has shown that a random menu cost model is able to match
the empirical relationship between oil price volatility and price change dispersion. I
will now study how changes in oil price volatility affect the ability of monetary policy
to stimulate output.
I shock the model with a permanent increase of 0.002 to log nominal output
in order to assess if the tradeoff between output and inflation is a function of the
aggregate volatility in the economy. This size shock amounts to a one month doubling
of the nominal output growth rate. The response of consumption and inflation on
impact is shown in Table 2.5 for periods of high and fixed oil price volatility. In the
first row is the impact on consumption in the ergodic state of the economy, while the
second row shows the same impact during a period of high volatility8. In the random
menu cost model, which is able to generate the increase in price change dispersion
due to an increase in oil price volatility, 52.4% of the doubling of log nominal output
translates into an increase in output. The other 47.6% of the increase goes into
inflation. When the model is shocked with a one standard deviation increase in oil
price volatility and a 0.002 permanent increase in log nominal output, 52.2% of the
increase in nominal output goes into output while 47.8% goes into the increase in
price level.
I conduct the same numerical exercise in the counterfactual fixed menu cost model.
In this model, only 48.0% of the increase in log nominal output goes into consumption
8High oil price volatility is defined as a period with a one standard deviation positive shock to
oil price volatility.
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Random Menu Cost Model Output IRF on Impact Price IRF on Impact
Baseline Volatility 52.4% 47.6%
High Volatility 52.2% 47.8%
Fixed Menu Cost Model
Baseline Volatility 48.0% 52.0%
High Volatility 44.1% 55.9%
Table 2.5: Inflation-Output Stabilization Tradeoff
on impact in the ergodic state of the economy. During a period of increased oil price
volatility, the percentage of the log nominal output that goes into consumption drops
to 44.1%.
These results show that increases in the volatility of an aggregate cost shock do
not substantially increase the trade off between output stabilization and inflation.
During periods of high oil price volatility, there is a drop in the efficacy of nominal
stimulus to increase consumption of less than 1%. Contrasting with this result are the
implications of the fixed menu cost model, where 8.2% less of the increase in nominal
output goes into consumption. The large decrease in monetary policy effectiveness is
primarily due to the increase in the extensive margin of price adjustment. All prices
that adjust move to their optimal price, but more prices are adjusting due to the
larger oil price shocks. The increased price adjustment causes more of the nominal
output change to be incorporated into the aggregate price level.
Price change dispersion is a key moment of the price change distribution for mea-
suring monetary non-neutrality. Midrigan (2011) shows that increased price change
dispersion increases monetary policy effectiveness. In testing how monetary policy
effectiveness responds to changes in volatility, price change dispersion is therefore a
key moment to examine. Matching the relationship between oil price volatility and
price change dispersion in a state dependent model implies that monetary policy
effectiveness is nearly time invariant in response to changes in volatility.
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2.4 Discussion
Another strand of the price setting literature asks how informational rigidities
affect price setting behavior. A noisy information processing model, such as that
used by Drenik and Perez (2016), would suggest that as the volatility of the common
oil price shock increases, firms would put more weight on their idiosyncratic shocks.
This mechanism would increase price change dispersion during periods of high oil
price volatility by decreasing the importance of the common cost shock. However,
oil prices are easily and accurately observable suggesting this is not an important
channel for the impact of oil price volatility on price setting behavior.
Rational inattention type models would in general generate the counterfactual
results for price change dispersion like the fixed menu cost model. If volatility of an
aggregate variable increases, firms optimally allocate more attention to the aggregate
shock. This makes the shock more important, and causes firms to put more weight
more on the common shock. This is argued in a general context by Menkulasi (2009)
and a price setting context by Zhang (2016). In a context without changes in volatility,
Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) argue that price setters pay more attention to
sectoral shocks than aggregate shocks because they are more volatile on average.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter argues that changes in aggregate volatility do not substantially re-
duce monetary policy effectiveness. I do this by constructing a general equilibrium
menu cost model of price setting behavior that matches the positive empirical rela-
tionship between price change dispersion and oil price volatility. Random and het-
erogeneous menu costs are necessary to match this relationship. This mechanism
attenuates the price reaction to a common volatility shock and increases price change
dispersion during periods of high volatility.
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My analysis of the effects of common volatility shocks on price setting behavior
can be applied beyond oil price volatility. Policy uncertainty, such as changes in the
volatility of fiscal or taxation plans, is another source of time varying volatility to
a common shock that can affect prices. Exchange rate volatility and global demand
volatility are other examples of common volatility shocks that affect price setting
behavior. Does increased monetary policy volatility cause price changes to be more
disperse and alter the monetary authority’s ability to be effective? In particular,
did the effects of nominal stimulus change during 1979 to 1982? During this period
the FOMC targeted the quantity of money rather than a federal funds rate, which
increased the observed volatility of the federal funds rate.
The tradeoff between output stabilization and inflation is nearly time invariant in
response to changes in aggregate volatility, suggesting that policy makers need to take
into account the source of volatility. If policy makers increase nominal stimulus more
strongly because they believe effectiveness is dampened during periods of increased
aggregate volatility, it would be an overreaction and induce unnecessary inflation.
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Chapter 3
Equipment, Structures, and Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
Fluctuations in time-varying economic uncertainty have been attributed with play-
ing a large role in macroeconomic behavior. Uncertainty is capable of generating
business cycle dynamics in models with fixed costs of investment. It generates a wait
and see mechanism where firms hold off on investment decisions until the uncertainty
has been resolved, temporarily reducing the investment rate. Models such as Bloom
(2009) and Bloom et al. (2014) show uncertainty shocks can have quantitatively large
effects on both overall investment and output.
Yet firms utilize many types of capital goods to produce. Heterogeneous capital
goods serve distinct purposes in production; a machine is used differently from a
building. Capital goods such as equipment and structures are not perfect substitutes,
but are complements in production. These goods differ in how they are utilized
but also in their depreciation rates and investment dynamics. While uncertainty
has been shown to affect overall investment decisions, less is known about individual
capital types. This paper explores how heterogeneous capital types, equipment and
structures, respond differentially to changes in economic uncertainty.
Equipment and structures are both important to the overall capital stock; there
was $11.6 Trillion in nonresidential structures and $5.4 Trillion in nonresidential
equipment at the end of 20111. Yet they exhibit different investment dynamics as
1Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets estimates from the BEA.
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shown in figure 3·1. The two series exhibit different dynamics, with a correlation of
0.55 between them over 1963Q1 to 2011Q1. Equipment investment has a correlation
of 0.86 with GDP growth while structure investment is much lower at .462.
These two types of capital also differ in their average depreciation rates, with
equipment depreciating at nearly 15% per year while structures depreciate about 3%
annually. The long lived nature of capital, such as structures, is capable of explaining
the irrelevance of lumpy investment in general equilibrium as shown by House (2014).
Lumpy investment behavior also differs between the two types of capital. Evidence
from Bloom et al. (2007) shows in a sample of U.K firms that 46.8% establishments
have no structure investment in a year while only 3.2% of them have no equipment
investment in a given year.
This paper explores the effects of uncertainty on investment types using aggregate
evidence from a SVAR. Using the uncertainty measure of Jurado et al. (2015), I
find than an unanticipated increase in economic uncertainty depresses investment in
equipment on impact, but takes four quarters to depress structures. The evidence
shows that the real options effect is present in both types of investment, but due
to differences in depreciation and utilization, takes longer to appear in structure
investment.
I then explore the results in a firm investment model with time-varying uncer-
tainty. The model features firms that are heterogeneous due to idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shocks. Aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity evolve with time-varying
volatility. Firms produce output using two types of capital, equipment and structures,
and labor. The two types of capital are not perfect substitutes in the production func-
tion. Each type of capital is subject to nonconvex costs of adjustment while labor
is costless to adjust. Nonconvex costs of adjustment imply changes in uncertainty
generate real options effects depressing investment.
2Total fixed investment has a correlation of 0.91 with GDP growth.
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Figure 3·1: HP Filtered US Data
Note: Quarterly data from 1963Q1 to 2011Q4 is filtered using an HP filter with λ = 1600.
I assume fixed costs of adjustment for investment. This nonconvex cost implies
each firm faces a hurdle rate to change their capital stock. This generates lumpy
investment, where many firms do not invest in a given quarter. During a period of
increased uncertainty, firms are less likely to invest due to the wait and see mechanism.
The model compares two different versions of fixed costs. In the first version, a firm
faces separate fixed costs of adjustment for each type of capital. During an increase in
uncertainty, aggregate investment in equipment will fall but investment in structures
will increase due to the large Oi-Hartman-Abel effect. The second version of the model
features a single fixed cost of capital adjustment, generating an economies of scope
mechanism for the investment decision. An uncertainty shock in this model generates
a decrease in equipment investment, and reduces the Oi-Hartman-Abel effect for
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structure investment due to firms disinvesting in both types of capital. There is
an increase in firms disinvesting that is not present in a model with separate costs
of adjustment. This model implies that the effect of the uncertainty shock persists
much longer than the separate fixed cost model. Aggregate empirical evidence would
suggest a model with economies of scope fits the data better.
Section 3.2 of the paper provides aggregate empirical evidence of the differential
effects of uncertainty shocks on heterogeneous capital investment types. Section 3.3
describes the model. Section 3.4 discusses the calibration of model parameters. Sec-
tion 3.5 explains the quantitative results following an uncertainty shock. Section 3.6
concludes the paper.
3.1.1 Literature Review
Bloom (2009) shows that uncertainty is capable of depressing economic output.
He presents evidence that firm level cross sectional volatility is highly correlated
with time series measure volatility. A partial equilibrium model is estimated with
fixed costs of adjustment and time varying uncertainty that shows an increase in
uncertainty triggers a drop and rebound in output. Bloom et al. (2007) study how
partial irreversibility of investment interacts with time varying uncertainty and show
that during periods of high uncertainty the responsiveness to shocks falls.
The model is builds upon Bloom et al. (2014). The authors build a general equi-
librium model with heterogeneity in firms due to idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
and allow firms to learn about the variance of productivity shocks the following pe-
riod. The model has adjustment costs to capital and labor, and finds that an increase
in uncertainty can explain a drop in output of about 3% due to the real options effect
present in employment and investment.
Tuzel (2010) argues that firms with a greater percentage of their capital held as
structures are more risky than firms with a greater percentage of equipment. She
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solves a production economy model of asset pricing where firms produce with two
types of capital subject to convex costs of adjustment. If a firm is subject to a bad
productivity shock, it will reduce investment in short lived equipment which distorts
the capital composition of the firm. As a firm increases its share of structures, it
becomes more vulnerable to bad productivity shocks, increasing the required equity
premium. She empirically finds that firms with a higher share of structures must pay a
3-6% higher return on average in order compensate for the additional risk. Jones and
Tuzele (2013) use a production economy model and show that when firms use capital
and inventory in production are riskier when they become more complementary.
House (2014) argues that it is long lived capital, rather than consumption smooth-
ing, that makes lumpy investment inconsequential for aggregate dynamics in a general
equilibrium model. He defines long lived investment goods as capital that has a yearly
depreciation rate of 5% or less per year. Firms have a near infinite elasticity of in-
vestment due to long lived goods, which allows firms to postpone or accelerate the
timing of investment purchases depending on the price of capital. This implies that
the distribution of firm capital holdings is of little importance due to the willingness
of firms to adjust when prices are favorable.
Evidence from Del Boca et al. (2008) on Italian firms suggest that there are differ-
ences in the time to build and plan of equipment and structures. Gomme and Rupert
(2007) discuss calibration of real business cycle models, and find that the depreciation
rates of these two types of capital also differ substantially. Their preferred calibration
finds that the quarterly equipment depreciation is over 5 times greater than structure
depreciation.
The paper builds off of the investment models of Khan and Thomas (2008) and
Bachmann et al. (2008). Lumpy firm investment is examined in a general equilibrium
context by Khan and Thomas (2008). The model features idiosyncratic productivity
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shocks to firm productivity and nonconvex adjustment costs, which induces a distri-
bution of firm capital. Aggregate dynamics are not substantially altered by firm level
lumpy investment compared to a neoclassical adjustment model, which the authors
suggest is due to consumption smoothing by the household. Bachmann et al. (2008)
examine a similar model and conclude that such a model can match the finding that
the sensitivity of investment is procyclical.
The adjustment costs creating economies of scope on the investment choice are
similar to Midrigan (2011). In his menu cost model, economies of scope on price ad-
justment are able to create real effects of monetary policy of a size comparable to the
Calvo model. The model allows firms to change all posted prices if the menu cost is
paid. The adjustment costs in my model of investment act through a similar mecha-
nism because paying the fixed cost allows firms to change all types of investment. Due
to complementarity between equipment and structure, an uncertainty shock causes a
larger drop in output and a more persistent response.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
This section provides evidence that uncertainty shocks differentially affect hetero-
geneous capital types. I use a quarterly SVAR model to show that an increase in
uncertainty depresses the investment rate of equipment on impact while the invest-
ment rate in structures takes about four quarters to respond.
I use aggregate US data from 1963Q3 to 2011Q4 to estimate the SVAR. The
model includes nine endogenous variables: the log of real gross domestic product,
the log of real investment in producers’ equipment, the log of real investment in
nonresidential structures, the log of manufacturing employment, the log of average
weekly hours, the log of the GDP price deflator, the nominal effective fed funds rate,
a measure of forward looking uncertainty, and the log of the S&P 500 index. Four lags
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of each variable are included. Following Bloom (2009), all variables are HP filtered
(λ = 1, 600) in the baseline estimation. Results using non-detrended data are in
appendix C.2.
Macroeconomic uncertainty is measured with the Jurado et al. (2015) forward
looking uncertainty index, which is a measure of economic predictability. It is con-
structed to be a model free uncertainty index from a large set of predictors. I use the
three month ahead measure of uncertainty, but Jurado et al. (2015) show that the
impulse response of output and employment to one month, three month, and twelve
month ahead uncertainty shocks are similar in magnitude and length3.
I investigate two different causal orderings. The first follows Bloom (2009) with
the following ordering: 
log(SP 500 Index)
uncertainty
federal funds rate
log(GDP Deflator)
Hours
log(Employment)
log(Structure Investment)
log(Equipment Investment)
log(GDP)

.
Ordering 1
Here a shock to uncertainty can affect real variables on impact4. I also estimate a
version similar to Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014) where a shock to uncertainty
has an immediate impact on the stock market, but affects real economic activity and
prices with a lag. Specifically I estimate:
3The U
y
t (3) measure in Jurado et al. (2015).
4Switching the order of equipment and structure investment does not change the results
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
log(GDP)
log(Equipment Investment)
log(Structure Investment)
log(Employment)
Hours
log(GDP Deflator)
federal funds rate
uncertainty
log(SP 500 Index)

.
Ordering 2
Both orderings are shocked with a four standard deviation shock to uncertainty
as in Jurado et al. (2015)5. The results with 1 standard error bands are shown in
figure 3·2.
The results from ordering 1 are in panel (A) show that an increase in uncertainty
depresses investment in equipment by 2 percent on impact while investment is struc-
tures is unaffected. Investment in equipment is reduced by up to 4 percent during the
second and third quarters after initial shock, and rebounds to trend within 7 quarters.
This response of equipment is consistent with the wait and see effect of uncertainty.
Structure investment falls after 4 quarters, and rebounds within 9 quarters after the
uncertainty shock.
Results from ordering 2 in panel (B) show that an uncertainty shock adversely
affects investment in equipment the quarter after the uncertainty shock. The causal
ordering restricts investment from responding in the quarter of the shock. Investment
in structures however does not significantly fall until 4 quarters after the shock. The
size and shape of both equipment and structure investment responses are similar to
ordering 1.
The evidence from the VAR suggests that increases in unanticipated uncertainty
leads to an economically and statistically significant drop in equipment and structure
investment. While the response of equipment investment is on impact of the shock,
5This is comparable to a 15-point shock to the error if the VXO uncertainty index was used.
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((a)) Ordering 1 ((b)) Ordering 2
Figure 3·2: VAR Impulse Response Function
consistent with standard arguments due to fixed costs of investment, the response of
structure investment is not evident for four quarters after the shock.
3.3 Model
The model follows Bloom et al. (2012) closely. It is now described in detail. Each
firm chooses equipment, kE,j,t, structure, kS,j,t, and labor nj,t to maximize profit, while
facing both aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
Each firm has a decreasing returns to scale CES production function of the form:
yj,t = Atzj,tn
γ
j,t((1− θ)kνE,j,t + (θ)kνS,j,t)
ψ
ν (3.1)
In the model we assume decreasing returns, therefore γ + ψ < 1, to pin down
firm size. In this parameterization we choose ν < 0, which implies that equipment
and structures are relative complements. This type of parameterization is motivated
by the idea that buildings are not of much productive use without machines running
inside. Labor and total capital are modeled in the typical Cobb Douglas structure.
The CES type of parameterization was also chosen by Christiano (1988) when creating
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a model with inventory and capital.
The law of motion of equipment is:
kE,j,t+1 = (1− δE)kE,j,t + iE,j,t (3.2)
Similarly, a firm’s stock of structure follows the law of motion:
kS,j,t+1 = (1− δS)kS,j,t + iS,j,t (3.3)
Each firm is free to adjust labor within each period, but must pay adjustment
costs if they change their equipment or structure stock.
Aggregate and idiosyncratic components of productivity follow the autoregressive
processes:
log(At) = ρ
Alog(At−1) + σAt−1t (3.4)
log(zj,t) = ρ
Z log(zj,t−1) + σzt−1j,t (3.5)
The variance of the two processes changes over time by allowing σAt−1 and σ
z
t−1
to follow two state markov processes. Firms find out the variance of the next pe-
riod today, so a shock to σt−1 impacts the variance of the productivity draw next
period. This allows the model to address questions of heightened uncertainty, by
enabling firms to react to future productivity news. The two productivity processes
are discretized using the Tauchen (1986) method.
This model is currently solved in partial equilibrium for computational reasons.
This implies that the firm will take wages and prices as given. Given the prices, the
model can be translated into a dynamic programming problem.
The state variables are current equipment and structure, the firm’s idiosyncratic
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productivity, aggregate productivity, and macro and micro uncertainty.
Denoting the stochastic discount factor by m, the firm’s value function can then
be expressed as:
V (kS, kE, z;A, σ
A, σZ) =
max
iE ,iS ,n
{y − wn− iE − iS − ACE(kE, k′E)− ACS(kS, k′S)
+ E[mV (k′S, k
′
E, z
′;A′, σA′, σZ ′)]}
(3.6)
given the law of motion of equipment, law of motion of structures, and the exoge-
nous productivity processes.
Following Bloom et al. (2012), we assume that micro and macro uncertainty
transitions follow the same timing. Thus, σAt and σ
z
t are replaced with a single state
variable St ∈ {L,H}. The relevant variables in the dynamic problem are St−1 and
St, which are the variance of the productivity shocks in the current period and the
variance of next periods productivity shock, which represents uncertainty by changing
the expected value of future profit.
At the beginning of time t, firms learn the variance of next periods productivity
draws, and the aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity draws for period t. Then
firms choose investment levels and labor in period t. This selects the level of capital
in period t+1, the value of the potential fixed cost to be paid in period t, and the
total production in period t.
3.3.1 Labor
Firm labor choice is a static decision and can be analytically calculated. The value
function with CES production function is given by:
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V (kS, kE, z;A, σ
A, σZ) =
max
iE ,iS ,n
{Aznγ((1− θ)kνE + (θ)kνS)
ψ
ν − wn− iE − iS
− ACE(kE, k′E)− ACS(kS, k′S)
+ E[mV (k′S, k
′
E, z
′;A′, σA′, σZ ′)]}
(3.7)
Maximizing with respect to labor gives:
nt =
[
w
Azγ((1− θ)kνE + (θ)kνS)
ψ
ν
] 1
γ−1
Plugging the maximized labor value into the dynamic programming problem gives:
V (kS, kE, z;A, σ
A, σZ) =
max
iE ,iS ,n
{(Atzj,t)
1
1−γ γ
γ
1−γw
γ
γ−1 ((1− θ)kνE,j,t + (θ)kνS,j,t)
ψ
(1−γ)ν
− iE − iS − ACE(kE, k′E)− ACS(kS, k′S)
− w γγ−1 (Atzj,tγ)
1
1−γ ((1− θ)kνE,j,t + (θ)kνS,j,t)
ψ
(1−γ)ν
+ E[mV (k′S, k
′
E, z
′;A′, σA′, σZ ′)]}
(3.8)
3.3.2 Adjustment Costs
This paper examines the response to an uncertainty shock when firms face
economies of scope on the investment choice, compared to separate fixed costs of
adjustment. Adjustment costs are in the form of fixed costs, which are a form of non-
convex adjustment, and the mechanism through which they work is more transparent
than partial irreversibility. The single fixed cost set up enabling economies of scope
is similar to that considered by Midrigan (2011), to account for sticky prices.
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The model is solved and simulated under three set ups; no adjustment costs,
separate adjustment costs of changing the level of equipment and structure, and a
single adjustment cost that allows a firm to adjust either type of capital.
In the separate adjustment costs setup, a firm must pay the fixed cost of adjusting
equipment if equipment investment is non-zero. It must also pay the fixed cost of
adjusting structure if structure investment is non-zero. This cost set up separates the
investment decisions that the firm faces.
The single fixed cost setup for adjusting both types of capital gives economies of
scope advantages in purchasing capital types, where firms benefit from changing both
in the same quarter. The idea behind this cost set up is that if a firm is building a
new structure, they would not need to shut down their current facilities to buy more
equipment. If a firm pays the fixed cost then they can change either type of capital.
In this set up we would expect equipment and structure investment to have a higher
correlation than the separate two cost set up.
In order to make the adjustment costs comparable, they are calibrated such that
4.5 percent of firms make an investmest in the steady state in any given quarter in the
ergodic distribution of the model. This matches the results of Cooper et al. (1999),
which finds 18 percent of plants experience an investment spike in total capital in any
given year6. This calibration allows us to compare the different cost set ups, as well
as compare it to models with only one type of capital.
Fixed costs are implemented by forcing firms to pay a given percent of current
profit. The calibrated numbers were chosen by simulating the model for a given fixed
cost to find one that gives the appropriate adjustment cost horizon.
In the calibration of two fixed costs, the fixed cost of adjusting structures was
chosen to be twice as large as the fixed cost of adjusting equipment. In simulations,
6Data from 6,900 plants during 1972-1991. Cooper et al. (1999) define an investment spike as a
gross investment rate greater than 20 percent.
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No Adjustment Cost AC0 0
Single Adjustment Cost AC1 FCT ∗ 1{IK+IS 6=0}
Separate Adjustment Costs AC2 FCE ∗ 1{IK 6=0} + FCS ∗ 1{IS 6=0}
Table 3.1: Adjustment Cost Set Up
changing this setup to equal fixed costs did not qualitatively affect the results. The
three different adjustment cost set ups are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.4 Calibration
Partial equilibrium parameters, wages and the stochastic discount factor, are set
to their frictionless steady state values from the general equilibrium model discussed
above.
Partial equilibrium wage is given by
w = γnγ−1((1− θ)kνE + (θ)kνS)
ψ
ν (3.9)
and the intertemporal price of consumption is given by
p = c−1 = (Y − δEkE − δSkS)−1 (3.10)
where all variables are in steady state.
Depreciation rates were taken from Gomme and Rupert (2007). The share in the
CES production function to structure was calculated from their calibration as well.
In their calibration they find that in a Cobb Douglas production function with three
inputs; equipment, structures, and labor, that the equipment share is 0.1549 and the
structure share is 0.1281. To calibrate the CES production function I set the elasticity
parameter to 1, then found the share due to structure and the total capital share.
Specifically, I used the method of matching on the equation below to find θ and ψ
where the values of α and η are known.
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Atztk
α
Ek
η
Sn
γ = Atztk
ψ(1−θ)
E k
ψθ
S n
γ (3.11)
The elasticity parameter is selected so that equipment and structures are com-
plements, with an elasticity of substitution of .5. In Christiano (1988), the elasticity
between inventory and capital is estimated for a production function of the same
type. The elasticity is estimated to be .42, suggesting that a value of .5 is a reason-
able calibration.
All parameters are listed in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Parameter Calibration
Preferences and Technology
θ 0.4527 Share in CES function of Structure
ψ 0.2830 Capital Share in Cobb Douglas function
ν -1 Elasticity parameter between capital types
γ 0.5 Labor Share
δE 0.0391 Quarterly Depreciation Rate of Equipment
δS 0.0072 Quarterly Depreciation Rate of Structure
ρA 0.95 Quarterly persistence of aggregate productivity
ρZ 0.95 Quarterly persistence of idiosyncratic productivity
Adjustment Costs
T 5.5 years Steady State Average Adjustment Horizon of Total Capital
Uncertainty Process
σAL 0.58% Quarterly standard deviation of innovations to aggregate productivity
σAH 1.91*σ
A
L Volatility in high aggregate uncertainty state
σZL 3.9% Quarterly standard deviation of innovations to idiosyncratic productivity
σZH 3.33*σ
Z
L Volatility in high idiosyncratic uncertainty state
piσL,H 5% Quarterly transition probability from low to high uncertainty
piσH,H 92% Quarterly transition probability of remaining in high uncertainty
Note: All model parameters related to uncertainty are coming from Bloom et al. (2012). Adjust-
ment cost horizon is coming from Cooper (1999). Production function parameters are coming from
Gomme and Rupert (2007)
3.5 Results
The impulse response functions were calculated by simulating 400 economies with
20,000 firms for 100 quarters. The first 25 economies were excluded from the analysis,
but used to initialize the distributions for idiosyncratic productivity, firm equipment,
and firm structure. In each economy, uncertainty is set to low for the first ten periods,
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then in period eleven the uncertainty state is increased to the high state. The high
uncertainty state has nearly twice the standard deviation of aggregate productivity
and slightly more than triples the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity in
the low state. Following the increase in uncertainty, the uncertainty state is allowed
to follow it’s markov transition process until it reaches low uncertainty, at which
point it is held low until the end of the simulation. The impulse response functions
are the aggregate responses averaged over the remaining 375 economies. All graphs
of aggregate variables are in percent deviation from the period before the uncertainty
shock and are shown for 20 quarters.
In the economy with no adjustment costs we expect to see an increase in output
following the uncertainty shock. This is due to the Oi-Hartman-Abel effect, where
since optimal choice of each type of capital is convex in the the productivity shocks,
increasing the variance will increase output. This is shown in figure 2 in the solid
dotted line.7
In the two models with adjustment costs, a single fixed cost and two separate fixed
costs for equipment and capital, we expect to see a real options effect where firms
will postpone production decisions while uncertainty is high. This effect is due to a
widening of the investment and disinvestment bands, which makes more firms inactive
following the shock. In the medium term, uncertainty falls and the Oi-Hartman-Abel
effect dominates when output rises above normal.
The figure shows that economies of scope in the investment decision cause output
to stay below trend for seven quarters, where in the separate fixed costs case output is
depressed for only two quarters. This shows uncertainty has more persistent negative
effects when firms face a single fixed cost. However, in both cases the medium term
output rises above trend.
Aggregate capital, which is the total amount of equipment and structure in the
7This is proven in the appendix for the Cobb Douglas case.
65
Figure 3·3: 2nd Moment Shock to Output
economy, drives the output response in the model. Without fixed costs, investment
initially increases and is back to trend to trend level within four quarters. However,
this causes a long lasting increase in the capital stock that takes more than four years
to return to long run trend. Figure 3 shows this response.
In both models with adjustment costs, investment falls the period of the uncer-
tainty shock due to the real options effect. With separate fixed costs, total investment
rises above trend the period following the shock before slowly returning to normal.
In the single fixed cost case, investment does not rebound as strongly and rises to its
peak level four periods after the shock. The slow rebound causes the capital stock to
return to trend much slower.
Percent of firms adjusting total capital has been calibrated to be equal to 4.5
percent per quarter in the ergodic distribution of both fixed cost models. Figure 4
shows that when uncertainty is forced to stay at the low level, more firms adjust
total capital when there are two fixed costs. This is primarily due to investment in
equipment.
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Figure 3·4: 2nd Moment Shock to Total Capital
Upon impact of the uncertainty shock, the percent of firms adjusting decreases in
both the single and separate fixed cost case. Two periods after impact, percent of
firms investing increases due to pent up demand for capital. With a single fixed cost,
the percent of firms investing rises higher than with separate adjustment costs, and
stays above it for 10 quarters. This implies firms do not find it worthwhile to pay
the fixed cost for adjusting either type of capital individually, but are willing to pay
a single cost to change both of them during this period. The complementary nature
of equipment and structures explains this result, because a single fixed cost enables
the two types of capital to adjust together.
Figure 5 shows the two types of capital exhibit different responses to the uncer-
tainty shock. In the model with no adjustment costs, investment in equipment jumps
immediately following the uncertainty shock. The increase in investment in structures
does not occur until two periods after the uncertainty shock.
The different adjustment cost set ups give very different results. In both ad-
justment cost set ups, firms have a real options effect on equipment; postponing
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Figure 3·5: 2nd Moment Shock Percent of Firms Investing
investment until the uncertainty clears up. Then the response causes an overshooting
in equipment stock. When adjustment costs are separate, equipment investment falls
one period then moves above trend which causes the stock of equipment to overshoot
trend.
Aggregate stock of structure reacts very differently to an uncertainty shock, ap-
pearing to lack a real options effect. In the separate cost set up, aggregate structure
investment does not respond strongly the period of the uncertainty shock, but the
following period it increases. Structure investment slowly returns to trend, which
causes a hump shaped response for the stock of structure. When there is a single
fixed cost, aggregate structure investment again does not react strongly upon impact
of the news of future uncertainty. It then rises slightly above trend the first period
of increased variance before falling below trend for 14 quarters, causing the stock
of structure to slowly decrease. This decrease is extremely long lasting, with the
structure stock being 1.5 percent below trend five years after the shock.
These results can be explained by firms substituting between the two types of cap-
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Figure 3·6: 2nd Moment Shock Disaggregated Capital
ital. In aggregate, firms wish to increase their production the quarters following the
uncertainty shock. But with the long lasting nature of structure and costly adjust-
ment, they substitute structure for equipment immediately following the uncertainty
shock and have a less efficient production process. The substitution effect is stronger
in the separate fixed cost case than with a single fixed cost. With a single fixed cost,
in aggregate the stock of structure falls below trend while the stock of equipment rises
above trend, reversing the direction of the substitution 6 quarters after the shock.
With separate fixed costs, firms that wish to increase production must pay fixed
costs for equipment and structure to expand. However, many firms that wish to
decrease production may not pay the cost and will simply let their equipment depre-
ciate. The depreciation effect is not as strong with structure capital, and compared to
equipment, more firms are paying the fixed cost to adjust structure downward. With
a single fixed cost, more firms that wish to decrease production find it worthwhile
to pay the fixed cost and adjust both equipment and structures downward. The ex-
tensive margin of adjusting equipment downward is much greater in the single fixed
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Figure 3·7: 2nd Moment Shock Percent of Firms Investing
cost case than with separate fixed costs, which explains the large difference between
the equipment stock in the two cases. This is shown in the bottom two panels of
figure 6 where the percent of firms with negative investment in either type of capital
is greater when there is a single fixed cost.
Part of this effect is due to the high depreciation rate of equipment and explains
why the stock of equipment is greater in the separate fixed cost case than the single
fixed cost case. Figure 6 shows that very few firms pay a fixed cost to only adjust
equipment downward, but many that pay the single fixed cost adjust equipment
downward.
The percent of firms adjusting downward explains the biggest difference between
the two cost set ups. With a single fixed cost we see firms paying the fixed cost
to adjust both types of capital downward. With two fixed costs very few firms are
paying either fixed cost.
Structure depreciates slowly, so fewer firms wait for it to depreciate as they do
for equipment. With a single fixed cost, the number of firms that wish to expand
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is roughly equal to the number of firms that wish to contract. These firms roughly
offset each other, which explains why we don’t see a large increase in structure. Then
due to the fixed cost, firms are slow to adjust to depreciation of the structure stock
and this explains why the stock of structure decreases. With two fixed costs, the
number of firms increasing structure is greater than the number of firms decreasing
structure. This is due to firms willingness to allow depreciation to decrease their
stock of structure rather than pay the fixed cost, though it is a much smaller effect
than what was seen in equipment.
The lack of real options effect on the period of impact for structure can be ex-
plained by the small number of firms investing to begin with. With two fixed costs
the percent of firms adjusting structure before the shock is less than one percent,
so the real options effect is hard to notice. With a single fixed cost the percent of
firms adjusting structure before the shock is about 3.5 percent, but firms are almost
equally adjusting structure up and down due to the long lived nature of structures.
Therefore the real options effect is not noticeable in aggregate because it affects both
firms adjusting upward and downward.
The intensive margin, the average investment of firms that do adjust, shows that
the firms that adjust make larger adjustments. Firms that adjust structure in the
period of the uncertainty shock make a much larger adjustment than firms do with
low uncertainty. This is shown in the top right panel of figure 7. Real options effects
would suggest that firms should wait to adjust, so the firms that do adjust are doing
so because they are very far from the optimal amount of structure. The opposite
effect occurs with equipment, where the average investment falls during the period of
adjustment. Both the average positive investment and average negative investment
increase, however the ratio of positive adjusters to negative adjusters changes so that
it is more heavily weighted towards the negative. The aggregate intensive margin for
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Figure 3·8: 2nd Moment Shock Percent of Firms Investing
equipment reflects this.
3.6 Conclusion
Model results suggest that the underlying dynamics of multiple capital types may
be important to include in a macroeconomic models. This model shows that a longer
lasting capital, such as structures, responds differently to increases in uncertainty
than faster depreciating equipment.
Empirical VAR results show a differential response of investment in equipment
and structures to an unanticipated shock to uncertainty. A model with economies of
scope in the investment decision qualitatively matches these results.
Economies of scope on the investment decision cause the impact of an uncertainty
shock to be larger and to persist longer on output. This is due to a mechanism where
firms adjust both types of capital downward. With separate fixed costs of adjustment,
firms do not adjust equipment downward after the impact of the uncertainty shock,
only paying the adjustment cost to invest positively.
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Upon the impact of an uncertainty shock, firms substitute equipment for structure
in aggregate. This is due to the long lived nature of structure and the high fixed cost
of adjusting it. The percent of firms adjusting either type of capital falls the period
of the uncertainty shock, due to a real options effect.
Future research on the subject should include a general equilibrium model to
further illustrate underlying capital dynamics. Firm level data should be used to
estimate the size of the fixed costs and the production function parameters.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 Stochastic Volatility Model
The stochastic volatility model is given by
logP ot = ρplogP
o
t−1 + e
σtνt (A.1)
σt = (1− ρσ)σ + ρσσt−1 + φνσ,t (A.2)
The process for σt is latent, and following Plante and Traum (2012), Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2011), and Born and Pfeifer (2014), a sequential importance resam-
pling particle filter is used to evaluate the likelihood function due to the nonlinearity
in the SV model. Once the likelihood function of the data is constructed, a random
walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to compute the posterior distribution of
the four parameters. Uniform priors are used for each parameter. The particle fil-
ter uses 40,000 particles to construct the likelihood, while 150,000 draws are used
in the RWMH algorithm with the first 50,000 discarded. The final acceptance ratio
of proposals is 0.32, within the recommended window of 15% to 40% in Roberts,
Gelman and Gilks (1996). In order to obtain the volatility series of the data, the
backwards-smoothing routine of Godsill et al. (2004) is used.
The mean estimates of the volatility process imply that a positive one standard
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deviation increase in the oil volatility increases the standard deviation of the oil price
level shock by (eφ-1) × 100%= 15%. 1
The prior and posterior distributions are in table 1.2.
Particle Filter Algorithm
A Sequential Importance Resampling particle filter is used to obtain the filtering
density p(σt|P ot ; Θ), the probability of σt given the oil price observations and process
parameters. The likelihood of observing a series of oil prices P oT , given an initial
value P o0 , can be written as:
p(P To ; Θ) =
T∏
t=1
p(P to |P t−1o ; Θ) =
∫
1
eσ0
√
2pi
exp
[
− 1
2
(
P 1o − ρpP 0o
eσ0
)2
]
dσ0
×
T∏
t=2
1
eσt
√
2pi
exp
[
− 1
2
(
P to − ρpP t−1o
eσ0
)2
]
p(σt|P t−1o ; Θ)dσt
(A.3)
The particle filter approximates the filtering density p(σt|P t−1o ; Θ) with a simulated
distribution. The distribution is formed with particles:
p(σt|P to ; Θ) ∼=
N∑
i=0
ωitδσit(σt) (A.4)
where
∑N
i=0 ω
i
t = 1 and ω
i
t ≥ 0. The SIR is a two step prediction and filtering
procedure that starts with an initial condition p(σ0|P to ; Θ) = p(σ0; Θ).
Using equation (A.2) I construct the conditional density p(σ1|P 0o ; Θ) =
p(νσ,1)p(σ0; Θ). To do this given N draws
(
σit|t
)N
i
from p(σt|P to ; Θ) and a draw of
exogenous shocks νiσ,t ∼ N(0, 1), equation (A.2) is used to compute
(
σit+1|t
)N
i
.
The filtering step uses importance sampling to update the conditional probability
from p(σt|P t−1o ; Θ) to p(σt|P to ; Θ). Assign to each draw a weight defined by ωit =
1A one standard deviation increase in the oil volatility shock increases the standard deviation of
the oil price shock from e−2.607 = 0.074 to e−2.607+0.14 = 0.085.
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p(σt|P t−1o , σt−1; Θ) = 1eσt√2piexp
[
− 1
2
(P
1
o−ρpP 0o
eσt
)2
]
. The weights are then normalized to
ω˜it =
ωit∑N
i=1 ω
i
t
(A.5)
The prediction step is then repeated for time period t+1 up to time period T.
The likelihood function is then approximated by
p(P To ; Θ)
∼= 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
eσ
i
0
√
2pi
exp
[
− 1
2
(
P 1o − ρpP 0o
eσ
i
0
)2
]
×
T∏
t=2
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
eσ
i
t|t−1
√
2pi
exp
[
− 1
2
(
P to − ρpP t−1o
eσ
i
t|t−1
)2
] (A.6)
Particle Smoother
I use the backward-smoothing routine of Godsill et al. (2004) to extract the
historical distribution of the volatilities. The factorization of the joint likelihood is
given by
p(σT |P to ; Θ) = p(σT |P to ; Θ)
T−1∏
t=1
p(σt|σt+1:T , P To ; Θ) (A.7)
The second factor is then simplified to
p(σt|σt+1:T , P To ; Θ) = p(σt|σt+1, P to ; Θ) =
p(σt|P to ; Θ)f(σt+1|σt)
p(σt+1|P to)
∝ p(σt|P to ; Θ)f(σt+1|σt)
(A.8)
The first equality comes from the Markovian properties of the model, f is the
state transition density from A.2. Equation A.4 allows us to construct p(σt|P to ; Θ) by
forward filtering, therefore I can approximate the above equation RHS by
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p(σt|σt+1, P to ; Θ) ∼=
N∑
i=0
ωit|t+1δσit(σt) (A.9)
The weights are given by
ωit|t+1 =
ωitf(σt+1|σit)∑N
i=1 ω
i
tf(σt+1|σit)
(A.10)
where the ωit are the weights from the filtering step. Denote σ˜
i
t the i
th draw from
the smoothing density at time t. At time T, draws σ˜iT are obtained from p(σT |P To )
with the weights ωiT . Progressing backwards in time, the recursions iteratively obtain
draws σ˜it by resampling with the weights A.10.
This process is repeated many times using different independent smoothing tra-
jectories to construct the smoothing distribution. Given the sequence of smoothed
states the smoothed residuals for both the level and volatility equations can also be
extracted. The smoothed volatilities were constructed using the mean of the posterior
distribution using 10,000 trajectories with 40,000 particles each.
RWMC Algorithm
The random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm estimates the oil process param-
eters ρo, ρσ, σ, and φ. The algorithm works as follows:
1) Starting from an initial guess Θ*, the parameter vector, generate the random
walk proposal density
Θpropj+1 = Θ
prop
j + cN(0, 1), j=1,...,150,000
where j is the number of draws and c is a scaling parameter set to induce an
acceptance ratio suggested in Roberts, Gelman, and Gilks (1997).
2) The Metropolis-Hasting step. Compute the acceptance ratio ψ =
min
(p(Θpropj+1 |pT
p(Θpropj |pT , 1
)
. A random number m is drawn from a uniform distribution over
the unit interval. Then Θj+1 = Θ
prop
j+1 if m ¡ ψ and Θj+1 = Θj+1 otherwise. This
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procedure is repeated for all draws.
The first 50,000 draws are used as a burn-in period, and the remaining 100,000
draws are used as the invariant distribution of the resulting Markov Chain.
A.1.2 GARCH Model
The estimated GARCH Model is
logP ot = ρplogP
o
t−1 + t (A.11)
where t = σtzt, and zt ∼ N(0,1)
σ2t = ω + α
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1 (A.12)
The estimated GARCH parameters are ρp = 0.997 (0.003), ω = 0.001 (0.001), α
= 0.199 (0.050), β= 0.615 (0.102).
A.1.3 Price Data
The BLS sampling process is now described in more detail. Prices are collected
from a survey that asks producers for the price as of Tuesday of the week containing
the 13th of the month. The BLS uses a a three stage procedure to select individual
items to include in the PPI. An industry is considered the starting point of sampling by
the BLS. The first sampling stage is selecting establishments within an industry. An
industry’s frame of establishments are drawn from all firms listed in Unemployment
Insurance as well as supplementary public lists used to refine the sampling population.
A price forming unit is created by clustering establishments within an industry in
the second step. Within a price forming unit, all members must belong to the same
industry. Within an industry, strata may then be established before sampling units
due to differences in price determining behavior due to firm characteristics such as
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production technology or geographic location. In each strata a price forming unit
is selected to be in the sample in proportion to its shipment value or number of
employees.
In the third step, after an establishment is selected and chooses to participate the
BLS uses disaggregation to select specific items to sample. This technique selects a
category of items to be included in the PPI by assigning a probability of selection
proportional to the value of the category within the reporting unit. The categories
are broken into smaller units until individual goods and services are identified. If an
individual item selected is sold at more than one price due to some characteristic such
as customer, size of order, or color, then the particular transaction is selected also by
probabilistic sampling.
Resampling of an industry accounts for changing market conditions every five to
seven years. In practice, many reporters and items are included before and after the
resampling. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) exploit a two month period in 2001 when
the BLS collected all data via by phone survey, rather than in the paper survey, and
show that the data collection method does not change price behavior.
The BLS item level data is used to construct all dispersion and frequency vari-
ables. The monthly industry level data is trimmed in the panel regressions if there
are less than 50 items within the industry in month t, and less than 15 observed price
changes during month t. Having a reasonable number of price changes for industry
j during month t is important to create an accurate measure of price change disper-
sion. Increasing the number of observed price changes does not change the results.
Industry level inflation used as an independent variable comes from the official pub-
lished Bureau of Labor Statistics numbers. Constructing average item level inflation
within a month does not affect the coefficient on oil price volatility, but does remove
significance for the lagged inflation coefficient.
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A.1.4 Industrial Production
Industrial production is taken from the Federal Reserve Board website. It covers
manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities and is intended to measure
variation in national output over the course of the business cycle.
A.1.5 Oil Prices
Daily oil prices are taken from the Department of Energy website. It is measured as
the spot price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil in Cushing, OK. This data
is available daily from 1986-2015 to construct realized volatility. Monthly measures
are the average monthly spot price. All nominal amounts are transformed into real
prices by deflating with the PPI Finished goods index. During the stochastic volatility
model and GARCH model estimation, data from 1986 to 2014 is used.
Composite Refiners Acquisition Cost and Brent Crude oil prices are used for ro-
bustness. RAC is a weighted average of domestic and imported oil. Brent Crude is
extracted from the North Sea and is a leading price benchmark for Atlantic basin
crude oils. This data is available monthly.
All three data series are available from the U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion.
A large literature attempts to explain movements in the price of oil. This section
will summarize some of the main findings, which show that most movements in the
price of oil that have been identified come from outside of the United States.
US oil prices were regulated by government agencies prior to 1973, leading to long
periods of constant price followed by infrequent adjustments. Due to the oil price
increase in 1973 and 1974, it became too difficult to provide a ceiling on the price of
oil and prices have since been allowed to fluctuate in response to supply and demand.
In the early 1980’s there was an increase in oil production in non-OPEC countries,
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which decreased the market share of OPEC from 43 percent in 1980 to 28 percent
in 1985 as documented by Baumeister and Kilian (2016). During this time, OPEC’s
efforts to influence the price of oil were unsuccessful.
There was a drop in the price of oil in the late 1990’s due to a decrease in the
demand for the price of oil that was partially caused by the Asian financial crisis of
1997. Kilian and Murphy (2014) argue the increase in the price of oil following in
1999 reflected a combination of factors including higher demand for oil from a global
demand recovery, and increased inventory demand due to coordinated supply cuts.
A brief increase in the price of oil in late 2002 and early 2003 were related to two
global oil supply disruptions. The first disruption was the Venezuelan oil strike from
December 2002 to February 2003. The second oil supply disruption was due to the
Iraq War in 2003
The large, long price increase in the nominal price of oil from $28 in 2003 to $134
in mid 2008, an increase of over 350 percent, or 250 percent in real terms is generally
considered to be due to increases in demand. Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2008b), and
Kilian and Hicks (2013) argue that the demand shifts are associated to the expansion
of the global economy and in particular additional demand from Asia. Oil producers
were unable to supply the increase in demand during this time, leading to the increase
in price.
Oil prices plummeted from $134 in June 2008 to $34 in February 2009 due to
anticipation of a global recession. Baumeister and Kilian (2015) argue that when it
became clear the financial system would not collapse in 2009, oil prices stabilized at
$100 per barrel. Kilian and Lee (2014) argue that a brief spike in prices in 2011 is
related to the Libyan uprising. Between June 2014 and January 2015 the price of oil
fell nearly fifty percent. This decline is attributed by Baumeister and Kilian (2015)
to a decline in global activity, as well as an increase in the supply of oil likely due to
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US shale production.
A.1.6 Industry Specific Oil Pass Through
I run an industry specific oil pass with industry and time fixed effects to control
for the macroeconomic cycle. Specifically I run a pass through regression of the form:
pij,t = αj + αt +
12∑
i=0
bi
(
so,j ∗∆logP ot−i
)
+ j,t (A.13)
If there is greater oil price pass through for industries with more oil usage then b0
and
∑12
i=0 bi should be positive. The results are in table A.1.
Short Run Pass Through Long Run Pass Through
0.135∗∗∗ 1.649∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.017)
Table A.1: Pass Through Regression
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. Number of observation=7,984.
Number of industries=51. R2 = 0.15. Robust asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level: * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
These results show that after conditioning on common aggregate shocks, that
industries with greater oil usage have greater pass through of oil prices.
A.1.7 Input Output Tables
Detailed Input Output “Use” tables from the Bureau of Economic are constructed
every 5 years. I use them to construct value added weights to aggregate industries
for price statistics. The oil share of value added is also constructed using the Input
Output tables. The oil producing sector is defined as NAICS 324110, Petroleum
Refineries. The NAICS definition of this category is:
This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in refining
crude petroleum into refined petroleum. Petroleum refining involves one
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Table A.2: NAICS 4 Industry Oil Share
Rank Industry Name θ
1 3251 Basic Chemical Manufacturing 0.243
2 3252 Resin, Synthetic Rubber, and Artificial Synthetic Fibers and Filaments Manufacturing 0.143
3 3253 Pesticide, Fertilizer, and Other Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing 0.124
4 3259 Other Chemical Product and Preparation Manufacturing 0.108
5 3255 Paint, Coating, and Adhesive Manufacturing 0.093
6 3333 Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing 0.043
7 3274 Lime and Gypsum Product Manufacturing 0.041
8 3221 Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills 0.035
9 3212 Veneer, Plywood, and Engineered Wood Product Manufacturing 0.034
10 3256 Soap, Cleaning Compound, and Toilet Preparation Manufacturing 0.033
Average 0.016
or more of the following activities: (1) fractionation; (2) straight distilla-
tion of crude oil; and (3) cracking.
The overall average dollar share of oil to value added is listed in table A.2 along
with the four digit industries with the largest oil share.
A.1.8 Regression Robustness Checks
As an additional robustness check I use the interquartile range of price changes
rather than the standard deviation. The results for the industry invariant regression
are shown in table A.3. The regressions for the three different measures of oil price
volatility show that oil price volatility is positive and statistically significantly related
to price change dispersion.
Panel A of Table A.4 shows the main industry specific oil price volatility results
using the interquartile range of non-zero price changes as the dependent variable.
Panel B of Table A.4 shows the results using the standard deviation of price changes,
including non-zero price changes. The table shows that oil price volatility still has a
positive correspondence with robust measures of price change dispersion.
The main industry results with GARCH oil price volatility is listed in Panel A of
A.5. Realized oil price volatility results are listed in Panel B of A.5.
Robustness results with 2008 dummy and additional covariates in Table A.6.
These results use the stochastic volatility measure of oil prices, and show that adding
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Dependent Variable: IQR of Price Change
Stochastic Vol Realized Vol GARCH Vol
∆log(P ot−1) 0.012 0.010 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
σt−1 0.397∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.023) (0.037)
pij,t−1 -0.099 0.038 0.053
(0.083) (0.111) (0.112)
∆IPj,t -0.007 -0.010 -0.010
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
EBPt -0.001 0.003
∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
VIXt−1 0.000 0.000 0.0002∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 63 63 63
N 10,946 10,946 10,946
Table A.3: Producer Price Change Dispersion and Macroeconomic
Shocks
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. Robust asymptotic standard
errors reported in parentheses are double clustered at the industry-month level: * p < .10; ** p < .05;
and *** p < .01.
additional covariates to the regression do not affect the impact that oil price volatility
has on price change dispersion inside or outside of the 2008 crisis period.
Table A.7 includes controls for lags of all variables and reports the sum. The
reported total effect is similar to the regression with one lagged observation for oil
price volatility.
I estimate the same regression for price change frequency as I have for price change
dispersion at the industry level. That is,
Yj,t = η ∗ (so, j ∗∆log(P ot−1)) + λ ∗ (so, j ∗ σt−1) + γ′Xj,t + αj + αt + jt (A.14)
where Yj,t is industry level price change frequency. The results are in table A.8. I
find no evidence that oil price volatility affects price change frequency.
Using a higher level of aggregation does not impact the baseline results. Table A.9
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shows the baseline results for a NAICS 3 level of industry aggregation for different
volatility measures. They show that all three measures of oil price volatility increase
industry price change dispersion even when there is greater heterogeneity within an
industry due to aggregation.
A.1.9 Price Data Comparison
Figure A·1: Monthly PPI Inflation and CPI Inflation
Note: Consumer Price index for all Urban Consumers and Producer Price Index
by Commodity for Finished Goods. Both indices are seasonally adjusted.
Figure A·1 shows producer price inflation plotted against consumer price inflation
for the sample period. The month over month producer inflation rate is more volatile
than the consumer inflation rate. The correlation between the two series is 0.82.
The price setting statistics are broadly similar except for a lower fraction of small
price changes in the PPI. The low fraction of small price changes removes mass
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from the middle of the price change distribution, which increases the kurtosis of the
distribution.
A.1.10 Central Bank Quote
The full text of Janet Yellen’s quote from the “Current Conditions and the Outlook
for the Economy” on June 6, 2016 are below.
In particular, an important theme of my remarks today will be the in-
evitable uncertainty surrounding the outlook for the economy. Unfortu-
nately, all economic projections are certain to turn out to be inaccurate
in some respects, and possibly significantly so. Will the economic situa-
tion in Europe or China take a turn for the worse or exceed expectations?
Will U.S. productivity growth pick up and allow stronger growth of gross
domestic product (GDP) and incomes or instead continue to stagnate?
What will happen with the price of oil? The uncertainties are sizable,
and progress toward our goals and, by implication, the appropriate stance
of monetary policy will depend on how these uncertainties evolve. Indeed,
the policy path that my colleagues and I judge most likely to achieve and
maintain maximum employment and price stability has evolved and will
continue to evolve in response to developments that alter our economic
outlook and the associated risks to that outlook.
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Panel A
Dependent Variable: IQR of Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) -0.268∗∗ -0.271∗∗ -0.267∗∗ -0.228∗
(0.118) (0.119) (0.131) (0.119)
so,j ∗ σt−1 2.168∗∗ 2.177∗∗ 2.184∗ 1.945∗∗
(1.007) (1.009) (1.112) (0.967)
pij,t 0.029 0.018 0.018
(0.106) (0.085) (0.082)
∆IPj,t 0.003 0.002
(0.008) (0.008)
PriceDispj,t−1 0.133∗∗∗
(0.042)
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 81 81 63 63
N 13,606 13,606 10,946 10,939
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Standard Dev of Price Change with Zeros
(1) (2) (3) (4)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) 0.002 -0.018 -0.043 -0.025
(0.036) (0.043) (0.044) (0.040)
so,j ∗ σt−1 2.114∗∗∗ 2.175∗∗∗ 2.254∗∗∗ 2.031∗∗∗
(0.693) (0.731) (0.815) (0.731)
pij,t 0.196
∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.194
(0.071) (0.070) (0.068)
∆IPj,t 0.004 0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
PriceDispj,t−1 0.112∗∗∗
(0.018)
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 81 81 63 63
N 13,606 13,606 10,946 10,939
Table A.4: Industry Specific Coefficient: Robust Price Change
Dispersion Measures
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. Panel A shows main regression
specifications with the interquartile range of price changes as the dependent variable. Panel B shows
the main regression specifications with the standard deviation of price changes including zeros as the
dependent variable. Robust asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses are double clustered
at the industry-month level: * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
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Panel A
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) -0.043 -0.052 -0.127 -0.097
(0.113) (0.115) (0.114) (0.109)
so,j ∗ σt−1 2.624∗∗∗ 2.676∗∗∗ 2.894∗∗ 2.693∗∗
(0.956) (0.980) (1.083) (1.014)
pij,t 0.085 0.091 0.091
(0.116) (0.111) (0.109)
∆IPj,t 0.000 -0.003
(0.014) (0.015)
PriceDispj,t−1 0.067∗∗∗
(0.016)
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 81 81 63 63
N 13,606 13,606 10,946 10,939
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) 0.134 0.127 0.014 0.039
(0.127) (0.127) (0.092) (0.088)
so,j ∗ σt−1 1.747∗∗∗ 1.766∗∗∗ 1.502∗∗∗ 1.428∗∗∗
(0.578) (0.586) (0.518) (0.493)
pij,t 0.080 0.081 0.082
(0.117) (0.114) (0.111)
∆IPj,t 0.002 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015)
PriceDispj,t−1 0.067∗∗∗
(0.016)
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 81 81 63 63
N 13,606 13,606 10,946 10,939
Table A.5: Industry Specific Coefficient: Alternative Oil Volatility
Measures
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. Panel A shows main regression
specifications with GARCH oil price volatility and the standard deviation of non-zero price changes
as the dependent variable. Panel B shows main regression specifications with GARCH oil price
volatility and the standard deviation of non-zero price changes as the dependent variable. Robust
asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses are double clustered at the industry-month level:
* p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
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Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) ∗ [Crisis = 0] 0.138 0.131 0.088 0.112
(0.084) (0.085) (0.087) (0.083)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) ∗ [Crisis = 1] -0.130 -0.171 -0.591∗ -0.553
(0.352) (0.360) (0.311) (0.298)
so,j ∗ σt−1 ∗ [Crisis = 0] 2.727∗∗∗ 2.763∗∗∗ 2.727∗∗∗ 2.561∗∗∗
(0.852) (0.866) (0.948) (0.888)
so,j ∗ σt−1 ∗ [Crisis = 1] 3.018∗∗∗ 3.000∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗ 2.563∗∗
(0.966) (0.963) (1.035) (0.972)
pij,t 0.081 0.088 0.089
(0.117) (0.113) (0.111)
∆IPj,t 0.003 -0.001
(0.014) (0.015)
PriceDispj,t−1 0.066∗∗∗
(0.015)
Time & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 81 81 63 63
N 13,606 13,606 10,946 10,939
Table A.6: 2008 Crisis Year Regression
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. σt is the stochastic volatility
measure of oil price volatility. Crisis year indicator is defined as 1 during 2008 and 0 otherwise. This
is the same crisis definition timing as Gilchrist et al. (2015). Robust asymptotic standard errors
reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry level: * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
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Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Price Change
SV RV GARCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)∑3
i=0 θj∆log(P
o
t−i) -0.561 -0.416 -0.548
(0.360) (0.305) (0.328)∑3
i=0 θjσt−i 2.658
∗∗ 2.155∗∗ 3.370∗∗∗
(1.002) (1.028) (1.255)∑3
i=0 pij,t−i 0.039 0.026 0.054
(0.127) (0.131) (0.123)∑3
i=0 ∆IPj,t−i -0.010 -0.008 -0.014
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055)∑3
i=1 θj∆log(P
o
t−i) -0.227 -0.265 -0.397
(0.249) (0.196) (0.260)∑3
i=1 θjσt−i 2.771
∗∗∗ 1.771∗ 2.601∗∗
(0.980) (0.097) (1.180)∑3
i=1 pij,t−i 0.041 0.036 0.059
(0.127) (0.128) (0.121)∑3
i=1 ∆IPj,t−i -0.012 -0.013 -0.016
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 48 48 48 48 48 48
N 10,835 10,835 10,835 10,835 10,835 10,835
Table A.7: Industry Specific Coefficient: Lagged Volatility
Structure
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. The dependent variable is
non-zero price change dispersion. All specifications use the stochastic volatility of oil prices. The
reported coefficients are the sum of the listed lagged variables. Robust asymptotic standard errors
reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry level: * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
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Dependent Variable: Frequency of Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
so,j ∗∆log(P ot−1) -0.183∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗
(0.087) (0.085) (0.093) (0.076)
so,j ∗ σt−1 0.470 0.739 0.897 0.537
(1.451) (1.610) (1.845) (0.906)
pij,t 0.859
∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.227) (0.190)
∆IPj,t -0.046 -0.052
(0.029) (0.035)
Freqj,t−1 0.547∗∗∗
(0.040)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries 81 81 63 63
N 13,606 13,606 10,946 10,941
Table A.8: Industry Specific Coefficient: Frequency of Price Change
Note: Sample period: 1998:M1 to 2014:M12 at a monthly frequency. This table shows the main
specification with frequency of price change as the dependent variable and stochastic volatility of
oil prices. Robust asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses are double clustered at the
industry-month level: * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Model Appendix
B.1.1 Profit Function
This section shows how to write the profit function in terms of
At(z),
Pt−1
St
, P ot , and σt.
To write the firm flow profits in real terms, I divide by Pt.
piRt (z) =
(pt(z)
Pt
)
yt(z)− Wt
Pt
Lt(z)− P
o
t
Pt
Ot(z)− χt(z)Wt
Pt
It(z) (B.1)
Then using equation (2.12) I substitute out for Ot(z) which gives after simplifica-
tion
piRt (z) =
(pt(z)
Pt
)
yt(z)− Wt + soP
o
t
Pt
Lt(z)− χt(z)Wt
Pt
It(z) (B.2)
After using firm cost minimization to write the production function as yt(z) =
At(z)Lt(z), I substitute out for labor Lt(z).
piRt (z) =
(pt(z)
Pt
)
yt(z)−
(Wt + soP ot
Pt
) yt(z)
At(z)
− χt(z)Wt
Pt
It(z) (B.3)
Now I substitute in the firm’s demand curve (2.11) and labor supply (2.7) to give
piRt (z) =
(pt(z)
Pt
)1−θ
Yt − 1
At(z)
Yt
(pt(z)
Pt
)−θ(
ωCt + so
P ot
Pt
)
− χt(z)(ωCt)It(z) (B.4)
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Lastly, the aggregate resource constraint implies that Yt = Ct. This gives the
equation
piRt (z) =
(pt(z)
Pt
)1−θ
Ct − 1
At(z)
Ct
(pt(z)
Pt
)−θ(
ωCt + so
P ot
Pt
)
− χt(z)(ωCt)It(z) (B.5)
Thus I am able to rewrite flow profits as a function of
(
At(z),
pt−1(z)
Pt
, P ot , σt
)
.
To simplify notation, I can write
piRt (z) =
(pt(z)
Pt
− 1
At(z)
Wt + soP
o
t
Pt
)(pt(z)
Pt
)−θ
Ct − χt(z)(ωCt)It(z) (B.6)
I need to write firm profits as a function of pt
St
in order to bound the state space.
To do this, first note that from equation (2.17) I can write Pt
St
as
Pt
St
= e
γ0+γ1logP ot +γ2σt+γ3log(
Pt−1
St
)+γ4(log(
Pt−1
St
)∗logP ot )+γ5(log(
Pt−1
St
)∗σt) (B.7)
and I can write Ct as
Ct = e
−
(
γ0+γ1logP ot +γ2σt+γ3log(
Pt−1
St
)+γ4(log(
Pt−1
St
)∗logP ot )+γ5(log(
Pt−1
St
)∗σt)
)
(B.8)
Then I take firm profits, multiply and divide by St, and replace Ct =
St
Pt
.
piRt (z) =
( pt(z)
St
Pt
St
− 1
At(z)
Wt + soP
o
t
Pt
)( pt(z)
St
Pt
St
)−θSt
Pt
− χt(z)(ωSt
Pt
)It(z) (B.9)
then use (2.7) to replace the real wage in terms of consumption.
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piRt (z) =
( pt(z)
St
Pt
St
− 1
At(z)
(ωCt + soP
o
t )
)( pt(z)
St
Pt
St
)−θSt
Pt
− χt(z)(ωSt
Pt
)It(z) (B.10)
Then I replace Pt
St
and Ct with the expressions from the law of motion.
piRt (z) =
(pt(z)
St
e−(Θ)− 1
At(z)
(ωe−(Θ)+soP ot )
)(pt(z)
St
e−(Θ)
)−θ
(e−(Θ))−χt(z)(ωe−(Θ))It(z)
(B.11)
where Θ is the expression for the law of motion of Pt
St
. Rearranging gives
piRt (z) =
(pt(z)
St
e−(Θ)− 1
At(z)
(ωe−(Θ) + soP ot
)(pt(z)
St
)−θ
(e(Θ))θ−1−χt(z)(ωe−(Θ))It(z)
(B.12)
which is the value function written in terms of
(
At(z),
pt−1(z)
St
, P ot , σt
)
. I also need
to rewrite the stochastic discount factor as
DRt,t+1 = β
Ct
Ct+1
= β
e
−
(
γ0+γ1logP ot +γ2σt+γ3log(
Pt−1
St
)+γ4(log(
Pt−1
St
)∗logP ot )+γ5(log(
Pt−1
St
)∗σt)
)
e
−
(
γ0+γ1logP ot+1+γ2σt+1+γ3log(
Pt
St+1
)+γ4(log(
Pt
St+1
)∗logP ot+1)+γ5(log( PtSt+1 )∗σt+1)
)
(B.13)
where expectations can be formed by using the law of motions for P ot , σt, St.
B.1.2 Model Solution
The recursive problem is solved on a discretized grid using value function iteration.
Knotek and Terry (2008) argue in favor of discretization over colocation in state
dependent pricing models due to robustness. The productivity grid is discretized
using 21 points, the real price grid has 171 points, oil price has 15 grid points, and oil
price volatility has 5 points. Expectations must be taken over the monetary growth
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rate and are discretized using 7 points, while the Krusell and Smith aggregate state
is discretized with 8 points.
The model is simulated using the non-stochastic simulation method of Young
(2010). Non-stochastic simulation tracks a histogram of firm states rather than a
large number of firms which removes Monte Carlo sampling error, and increases the
speed of the simulation compared to large firm panels. The overall numerical solution
is outlined below.
1. Guess a set of γi for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in the aggregate law of motion.
2. Firms choose relative price to solve profit maximization given the conjectured
forecast for the aggregate state. They are maximizing equation (2.18).
3. Given the policy function from step 2, the model is simulated using non-
stochastic simulation. This implies that the aggregate variables P ot , σt, and St
are simulated from their discretized transition matrices. A histogram of weights
is tracked over the idiosyncratic variables pt(z)
Pt
, At(z), and χt(z). The density
of prices at each individual state is updated each period using the transition
matrix for each variable.
4. Using the simulated data, the aggregate law of motion is re-estimated using the
data.
5. γiter+1i are updated using the new values.
6. Check if the equilibrium has converged. The maximum Den Haan statistic is
computed over the full simulation of 2000 periods (166.66 years). The maximum
Den Haan statistic is the maximum difference between the simulated value of
log(Pt
St
) from the model, and a dynamic forecast of log(Pt
St
)DH . The dynamic
forecast of log(Pt
St
) is constructed by repeated application of the Krusell and
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Smith forecasting equation, using the resulting predicted dependent variable
in the construction of the following periods forecast. This method allows for
accumulation of prediction error within the forecasting system. The specific
equilibrium convergence criterion is | DHmaxiter+1 − DHmaxiter |< .0001. After this
criterion is met the aggregate law of motion has converged and model equilib-
rium is reached.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Model Appendix
The simple model below illustrates why output increases when there in an increase
in uncertainty when the firm faces no adjustment costs. An increase in uncertainty
increases the variance of aggregate and idiosyncratic TFP. The firm has a Cobb Dou-
glas production function with decreasing returns to scale and three inputs; equipment,
structures, and labor.
Here, assume the firm rents equipment and structure, and pays wages to workers
while taking the rental rates and wage as given. The firm is maximizing the present
value of future profits.
max
ke,ks,n
∞∑
t=0
Atk
α
e,tk
β
s,tL
γ
t − wtLt − re,tke,t − rs,tks,t (C.1)
The first order conditions of the firm are all within period, so this can be simplified
to a one period problem. The firm then optimally chooses:
L = φ1A
1
1−γ k
α
1−γ
e k
β
1−γ
s (C.2)
ke = φ2A
1
1−αk
β
1−α
s L
γ
1−α (C.3)
ks = φ3A
1
1−β k
α
1−β
e L
γ
1−β (C.4)
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where φ1, φ3, and φ3 are functions of parameters including the rental rates and
wage. Solving for the two types of capital in terms of parameters and the aggregate
productivity shock.
ke = χ1A
1−γ
(γ−1)(α+β+γ−1)(C.5)
ks = χ2A
−α2+2α(β+γ−1)+(γ−1)(β+γ−1)
(α+γ−1)(β+γ−1)(α+β+γ−1) (C.6)
χ1 and χ2 are function of parameters including rental rates and wage. For the
calibrated values in this paper α = .1549, β = .1281, and γ = .5, A has an exponent of
4.61 on equipment and an exponent of 3.40 on structure. Thus, both types of capital
are convex in the productivity shock, so an increase in the variance of the shock will
lead to higher levels of capital, which is proven by Jensen’s inequality. This explains
the results we see in the impulse response functions.
C.2 VAR appendix
This section shows model results for non-HP filtered data. Panel (a) of figure C·1
shows the response of equipment and structure investment for ordering 1, while panel
(b) shows the results for ordering 2. Both sets of results show that an unanticipated
shock to uncertainty reduces investment of both types. However compared to the HP
filtered data the impact is more severe and persistent.
Investment in equipment falls on impact or the quarter after the shock depending
on the ordering, and is still depressed by 2 or 4 percent after 12 quarters. Investment
in structures takes 4 quarters to fall, but stays depressed for over 12 quarters in
ordering 1, and recovers 12 quarters after the shock in ordering 2. The magnitude of
the drop is greater than the HP filtered data, as equipment investment falls by 6.5%
here, but a maximum of 4% in the HP filtered data. Investment in structures falls
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((a)) Ordering 1 ((b)) Ordering 2
Figure C·1: VAR Impulse Response Function
by up to 6% in the unfiltered data, but only up to 2.5% in the HP filtered data.
Though the HP filtered and non-filtered investment responses have different per-
sistence and magnitude, the qualitative results are similar. Investment in equipment
falls immediately after the shock, but investment in structures takes 4 quarters to fall.
Both sets of results suggest that the characteristics of capital type play a significant
role in investment dynamics.
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